David Hayes v. State, 518 S.W.3d 585

On Jan 19, 2015, three dogs owned by David Hayes attacked a bicyclist (Mikel Kirkpatrick); an affidavit and warrant led to seizure of the dogs.
A justice court found the dogs had caused serious bodily injury and ordered two destroyed and one returned; Hayes appealed to the county court at law and timely requested a jury trial (fee paid).
The county court at law sustained the State’s objection to the jury demand, removed the case from the jury docket, and held a bench de novo trial.
The county court found the dogs dangerous, that Hayes was the owner, and that Kirkpatrick suffered serious bodily injury; it ordered all three dogs humanely destroyed and awarded $2,780 to Henderson County.
Hayes appealed, arguing the court erred by denying his right to a jury trial on the de novo appeal.
The Court of Appeals considered (1) whether an owner may appeal a justice-court destruction order under Chapter 822 and (2) whether a jury may be requested on the de novo appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to appeal a justice-court order to destroy dogs under Chapter 822 subchapter A	Hayes: Justice-court destruction orders are appealable; he timely appealed and paid bond/fee	Henderson County: Subchapter A is silent on appeals; silence implies no right to appeal	Held: Appeal allowed — subchapter A does not bar appeals; justice-court appeals available under §51.001 when amount in controversy exceeds $250 and statutes construed in favor of appeal
Right to a jury trial on de novo county-court appeal	Hayes: Property (pet) forfeiture implicates constitutional jury right; timely requested and paid fee	Henderson County: Chapter 822 is silent on jury; county court struck jury demand (no express statutory grant)	Held: Denial of jury request was reversible error — right to jury on de novo appeal is protected by Tex. Const. art. I, §15 and applicable rules; remand for proceedings with jury available

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standards for reviewing subject-matter jurisdiction and statutory construction)
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. 2008) (statutory construction principles—give effect to plain meaning)
Lira v. Greater Houston German Shepherd Dog Rescue, Inc., 488 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2016) (pet dogs are special form of personal property)
Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996) (denial of jury demand reviewed and harm from wrongful denial)
PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004) (silence in statute does not necessarily imply intent)
Consol. Furniture Co. v. Kelly, 366 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1963) (rules controlling appellate procedure construed in favor of the right to appeal)
In re Jenevein, 158 S.W.3d 116 (Tex. 2003) (legislature may limit appeal rights but must do so clearly)
Pitts v. State, 918 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no pet.) (discussed as authority on related animal statutes but distinguished)