David Hamrick, Maggie Hamrick, Sue Bertram and Steve Bertram v. Tom Ward and Betsey Ward, 446 S.W.3d 377

In 1936 Paul Bourgeois received 41.1 acres; a dirt road along the east edge provided access to Richardson Road. In 1953 Paul severed a 2-acre, landlocked parcel that used that dirt road for access.
The 2-acre parcel changed hands and Anna Bell (Gomez) built a house addressed to Richardson Road and used the dirt road; later developer William Cook built a subdivision (Barrington Woods) on the remaining tract and planned to close that dirt road.
Cook filed a unilateral special restriction purporting to create a limited 15-foot easement benefiting Anna Bell; she did not consent and learned of the document years later.
Tom and Betsey Ward purchased Anna Bell’s property (subject to a life tenancy), used and improved the dirt road, and sought a declaratory judgment of an implied 25-foot easement across Lots 3–4 after the subdivision owners (Hamricks) sought to enjoin their use.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Wards, declaring a prior use easement; the court of appeals affirmed but held necessity need only be shown at severance. Both parties appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hamrick)	Defendant's Argument (Ward)	Held
Proper doctrine for roadway access easements to previously unified, landlocked parcels	Necessity easement requires strict, continuing necessity; prior use is inappropriate for a roadway	Prior use easement suffices; necessity only at severance is required	Court holds roadway access to such parcels must be pleaded/proved under necessity easement (strict and continuing necessity)
Whether Wards proved requisite necessity for an implied easement	Wards failed to show continuing necessity	Wards contend necessity at severance suffices	Court did not decide on the merits; remanded so Wards may elect to pursue a necessity-easement claim
Whether Wards can proceed on a different theory on remand	Hamricks rely on that the Wards tried only prior use theory below	Wards seek leave to pursue necessity theory after clarification of law	Court permits remand and allows Wards to plead a necessity easement given controlling law clarification
Effect on related defenses and fees (bona fide purchaser; attorney’s fees)	Hamricks argued BFP defense and that fee award was improper	Wards defended prior judgment and fees award	Court did not reach these issues; remanded for reconsideration consistent with holding

Koonce v. J.E. Brite Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1984) (describing elements of easement by necessity)
Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1966) (addressing implied easement by prior use)
Alley v. Carleton, 29 Tex. 74 (Tex. 1867) (early recognition of way of necessity for roadway access)
Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, 364 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1962) (standardized elements for prior use easements)
Mitchell v. Castellaw, 246 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. 1952) (strict necessity required when a grantor reserves an easement)
Bains v. Parker, 182 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1944) (discussing temporary nature of easement by necessity)
Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1950) (assessing roadway easement claims under necessity doctrine)
Howell v. Estes, 12 S.W. 62 (Tex. 1888) (formulation of prior use doctrine for non-roadway improvements)