David Gordan Schmidt (d/B/A ABC Bonding Company) and Greenbrier Equities, LLC v. Brenda Crawford, 584 S.W.3d 640

Background

Hundreds of homeowners sued Schmidt (ABC Bonding) and Greenbrier alleging the defendants caused deeds of trust to be executed/altered and recorded, creating unlawful homestead liens tied to bail-bond loans and seeking relief including statutory damages under Chapter 12, quiet title, and declaratory relief.
Defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (CPRA/anti‑SLAPP), arguing the recorded deeds were communications on a matter of public concern and thus covered by the Act.
The trial court denied the motion, reasoning public filings are not automatically "matters of public concern" and expressing concern that applying the Act would nullify Chapter 12 remedies for fraudulent liens.
On appeal the court reviewed de novo whether the CPRA applied, whether plaintiffs had made the required prima facie showing, and whether any statutory exemptions applied.
The court held the filings qualified as communications on a matter of public concern (community well‑being) so the CPRA applied, but plaintiffs failed to present clear and specific prima facie evidence supporting their claims.
The court affirmed denial of dismissal only as to plaintiffs’ constitutional quiet‑title and declaratory‑relief claims under Article XVI, § 50 (homestead protections), reversing the denial as to other claims and remanding for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiffs' Argument	Defendants' Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs’ claims are based on or in response to defendants’ exercise of free speech/petition (CPRA scope)	Claims arise from illegal liens and are not protected speech; filings are not matters of public concern	Filing/recording deeds are communications submitted to public records and concern community/economic well‑being and marketability of property	Held: filings are communications on a matter of public concern (CPRA applies)
Whether plaintiffs made a prima facie evidentiary showing required to avoid dismissal under the CPRA	Plaintiffs argued they "can/will" show evidence but did not submit clear, specific evidence in trial court	Defendants argued plaintiffs’ pleadings alone insufficient; no affidavits or admissible record evidence submitted	Held: Plaintiffs failed to make prima facie showing; dismissal warranted for non‑constitutional claims
Whether the CPRA’s commercial‑speech exemption (§27.010(b)) applies	Plaintiffs: defendants are in bail‑bond business and communications arose from commercial transactions; plaintiffs (customers) were intended audience	Defendants: recordings were public notice to the world, intended for general public/potential buyers, not primarily for defendants’ customers	Held: Exemption does not apply because intended audience was public at large; plaintiffs’ petition pleaded they were unaware of recordings, negating the exemption
Whether CPRA can be applied to Chapter 12 fraudulent‑lien claims and to constitutional quiet‑title claims under Art. XVI, § 50	Plaintiffs: Applying CPRA would nullify Chapter 12 remedies and undermine constitutional homestead protections; illegal deeds are not protected speech	Defendants: CPRA is a procedural threshold applicable to statutory and common‑law claims; no irreconcilable conflict identified with Chapter 12	Held: CPRA applies to Chapter 12 claims (procedural threshold OK) but cannot displace Article XVI, § 50 protections; quiet‑title/declaratory claims under §50 are exempt from dismissal under CPRA because of constitutional supremacy and remedial structure

Key Cases Cited

Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. 2018) (CPRA interpretation and three‑step framework)
Quintanilla v. West, 534 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017) (applying CPRA to financing‑statement recordings)
Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (statements affecting real‑property transfers as public‑concern speech)
Bedford v. Spassoff, 520 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. 2017) (notice pleading insufficient to meet CPRA prima facie requirement)
Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, 505 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2016) (Article XVI, § 50 homestead lien limits and invalidity rule)