David Gevas v. Christopher McLaughlin
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14654
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff David Gevas, a life-sentenced inmate at Henry Hill Correctional Center, testified that his cellmate William Adkins repeatedly threatened to stab him and identified himself as a gang member. Gevas felt in fear for his life.
- Gevas told three prison officials (counselor Wayne Steele, acting warden Steve Wright, and internal affairs officer Christopher McLaughlin) about the threats, handed/mailed written notes to some, and requested protective custody; he was told protective custody was not available.
- Gevas knew of an option to "refuse housing" (which would trigger disciplinary segregation and a ticket) but declined it because he feared losing his job and visitation privileges; four days after reporting the threats, Adkins stabbed Gevas in the neck with a pen.
- At trial Gevas (represented by counsel) rested on his testimony alone; the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for defendants under Rule 50(a), holding Gevas had not shown the officials were subjectively aware of the risk.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a jury could credit Gevas’s testimony that he gave specific, credible warnings to the defendants and therefore could find they had actual knowledge of a substantial risk and were deliberately indifferent.
- The Seventh Circuit also held that requiring Gevas to invoke "refuse housing" (and thereby commit a disciplinary infraction) was not necessarily a reasonable response by officials and did not clearly entitle the officials to qualified immunity on the record presented; discovery rulings on certain records were remanded for reconsideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm | Gevas argued he gave specific warnings (in-person and written) identifying Adkins and the stabbing threats, so officials knew and drew inference of risk | Defendants argued they lacked actual knowledge and had offered a reasonable alternative (refuse housing) | Reversed: jury could credit Gevas and infer actual knowledge for all three officials |
| Whether offering "refuse housing" made defendants' response reasonable | Gevas argued refusing housing would force him to commit a disciplinary infraction and was not a reasonable or adequate protective measure | Defendants argued informing Gevas of the refusal option satisfied a reasonable response obligation | Held: On this record, requiring plaintiff to disobey orders and incur discipline is not necessarily reasonable; issue for jury at retrial |
| Whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity | Gevas argued forcing an inmate to choose disciplinary insubordination for safety is plainly unreasonable and not protected by qualified immunity | Defendants argued no clearly established rule prevented relying on the refuse-housing option | Held: Qualified immunity unavailable on this limited record because the duty to protect prisoners made the defendants’ position unreasonable enough that a reasonable official should have known it violated the Eighth Amendment |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery of inmate/defendant records | Gevas argued Adkins’s criminal/institutional history and availability of single-occupancy cells were relevant to prove risk and possible alternatives; sought in camera review/protective order | Defendants raised institutional security concerns and opposed disclosure | Held: Court abused discretion in denying Adkins’s records in toto; remanded for in camera review and appropriate protective orders; denial of other categories partially affirmed/limited |
Key Cases Cited
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (establishes deliberate-indifference standard and requirement of actual knowledge)
- Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90 (7th Cir.) (prisoner proves actual knowledge by showing complaints about specific threat)
- Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987 (7th Cir.) (letters to administrators may support inference of official knowledge)
- Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630 (7th Cir.) (examples where specific inmate complaints supported inference of actual knowledge)
- Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir.) (guards need not accept all asserted fears as credible; assesses credibility but distinguishes policies treating refusal-of-housing as disciplinary)
- Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904 (7th Cir.) (physical assaults by other inmates constitute serious harm)