876 F.3d 285
7th Cir.2017Background
- In January 2005 David Frentz shot and killed his housemate Zackary Reynolds; facts included multiple inconsistent statements by Frentz, physical evidence tying him to the scene, and jailhouse informant testimony describing changing narratives and attempted cover-ups.
- Frentz had a decades-long alcohol dependence, stopped drinking the day before the shooting, was prescribed medication for possible delirium tremens, and reported hallucinations to a friend the night before the homicide.
- Trial counsel filed a notice of intent to pursue an insanity defense and retained Dr. Philip Coons as an expert, but later withdrew Coons as a witness, preventing an insanity defense at trial. Counsel nevertheless presented lay evidence of drinking/withdrawal and argued lack of mental state for murder; no expert testified on insanity.
- A jury convicted Frentz of murder and related drug charges; he was sentenced to 59 years. State appellate review affirmed, and postconviction relief was denied after an evidentiary hearing where a new expert (Dr. Masbaum) opined Frentz was of unsound mind but relied on limited/changed information.
- Frentz sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to pursue an insanity defense. The district court denied relief; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference and Strickland standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was objectively deficient in not pursuing an insanity defense | Frentz: counsel should have persisted (e.g., sought another expert) because evidence of withdrawal/hallucinations made insanity plausible | State: counsel investigated, retained Coons, and reasonably decided (strategy) not to present the defense given equivocal expert opinion and conflicting facts | Held: Not deficient — counsel’s decision fell within reasonable strategic judgment and was supported by record evidence |
| Whether Frentz was prejudiced by counsel’s decision (Strickland prejudice prong) | Frentz: absence of expert testimony and an insanity instruction likely changed outcome; jury needed expert to credit delirium tremens defense | State: existing lay testimony and counsel’s argument already presented withdrawal evidence; expert would not likely have persuaded a jury given other evidence | Held: No prejudice — no reasonable probability of a different outcome if insanity defense had been presented |
| Whether the state courts’ factual finding rejecting Masbaum’s opinion was unreasonable under AEDPA | Frentz: Masbaum’s opinion established insanity and postconviction court unreasonably discounted it | State: Masbaum relied on incomplete, self-serving statements and conflicted with Coons’s equivocal findings and trial record | Held: State court’s factual determinations were reasonable and entitled to deference |
| Whether counsel’s withdrawal of Coons and failure to obtain another expert constituted failure to investigate | Frentz: trial counsel should have further investigated or retained another psychiatrist | State: counsel reasonably relied on Coons’ indeterminate evaluation and other record facts to forego further experts | Held: No ineffective assistance — the record does not show counsel had clear reason to believe insanity defense would be meritorious |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Adams v. Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 2006) (counsel not deficient for reasonable decision that makes further investigation unnecessary)
- Stevens v. McBride, 489 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2007) (deference to state court finding that defendant appreciated wrongfulness at time of killing)
- Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000) (defines which state-court decision is reviewed under AEDPA)
- Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997) (review permits several equally plausible outcomes to stand)
- Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. 2000) (Indiana definition of murder as knowing or intentional killing)
- Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. 1998) (courts reject mental-state defenses that conflict with claims of actual innocence)