David Fields v. City of Pittsburgh
714 F. App'x 137
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Fields owned a car dealership next to his wife’s daycare; a vehicle blocking the daycare prompted a police response on July 8, 2013.
- Officer Labella told Fields to move his van; an exchange escalated after Labella refused to move his cruiser and called to tow the van.
- Fields recorded Labella on his phone; Fields alleges Labella slapped him, knocked the phone away, and grabbed his collar, but Fields later described the contact as brief.
- Later, Fields confronted officers near Lieutenant Reilly’s car, made two quick moves toward Labella with fists balled, and was handcuffed after resisting; a Taser was used.
- Fields pleaded guilty to reduced state charges (harassment and disorderly conduct). He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting false arrest, Fourth Amendment excessive force, conspiracy, and state tort claims; the District Court granted summary judgment for defendants and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- On appeal, Fields challenged Heck preclusion of his false-arrest claim and argued the officers used excessive force (challenging both the initial slap and the later Tasing).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fields’ false-arrest § 1983 claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey | Fields contends officers lacked probable cause and fabricated an affidavit of probable cause, so his § 1983 false-arrest claim should proceed | Defendants argue Fields’ guilty plea admits probable cause; Heck bars collateral attack on conviction via § 1983 | Held: Heck bars the false-arrest claim because Fields’ guilty plea implies probable cause and has not been invalidated |
| Whether Labella’s initial slap/grab constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure or excessive force | Fields argues the slap was a battery that provoked later force and should be considered in the excessive-force analysis | Defendants argue the slap/grab was brief and did not amount to a seizure; thus it does not trigger Fourth Amendment protection for that act | Held: The slap/grab was not a seizure (Fields moved freely afterward), so it did not violate the Fourth Amendment |
| Whether officers’ use of a Taser and force in arrest was excessive | Fields argues the earlier provocation and the circumstances made the Tasing unreasonable | Defendants argue probable cause existed (supported by the plea), Fields made threatening gestures and resisted, and the Tasing was proportional and reasonable | Held: Use of the Taser during a valid arrest was objectively reasonable given threatening gestures and active resistance; excessive-force claim fails |
| Whether the district court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing federal claims | Fields implicitly favors keeping state claims in federal court | Defendants supported dismissal of federal claims and decline of supplemental jurisdiction | Held: District Court did not abuse discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims after disposing of federal claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (bars § 1983 claims that would impugn a conviction not invalidated)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (excessive-force reasonableness factors)
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (separate analysis for each seizure; limits on provocation rule)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity and excessive-force analysis)
- Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (probable cause can be for any offense supported by circumstances)
- Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (probable cause principles)
- Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628 (false arrest requires absence of probable cause)
- Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343 (discusses foreseeability, provocation, and proximate causation in force cases)
- Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497 (force use in arrests)
- Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141 (Fourth Amendment seizure standard)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (guilty pleas not invalid merely to avoid harsher sentence)
