David Earl Bowyer v. Deborah L. Wyckoff
238 W. Va. 446
| W. Va. | 2017Background
- Co-owners of surface and mineral tracts in Doddridge County disputed development and leasing; some respondents had leased mineral interests to Antero Resources.
- Wyckoff (plaintiffs/respondents) sued Bowyer (defendant/petitioner) in 2010 seeking partition in kind or by sale of the surface.
- Bowyer counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint seeking partition (allotment or sale) of surface and/or minerals; he wanted to develop shallow minerals and lease deeper rights to Antero.
- After mediation failed, respondents moved for summary judgment; circuit court granted summary judgment to respondents and denied Bowyer leave to further amend his third-party complaint (order dated Oct. 18, 2015).
- Bowyer appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court adopted an extra statutory prerequisite (inability to agree on development) for partition by sale not required by W. Va. Code § 37-4-3, (2) the court incorrectly found the parties agreed on development, and (3) the court abused discretion in denying his motion to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court improperly added a non‑statutory prerequisite (inability to agree on development) for partition by sale | Wyckoff argued that the court’s additional statement was appropriate in context and supported denial | Bowyer argued the additional prerequisite is not required by § 37-4-3 or Riley and thus was error | Court agreed the extra factor was error but affirmed because it also applied the correct statutory elements and Bowyer failed to meet them |
| Whether the court erred in finding the parties agreed on how to develop the mineral estate | Wyckoff relied on the court’s factual finding that parties were not sufficiently at odds to justify sale | Bowyer asserted there was disagreement and holdouts preventing development | Court did not need to reach this factual challenge because Bowyer did not prevail on the statutory partition elements; this factual dispute was not a basis for reversal |
| Whether Bowyer should have been allowed to amend his third‑party complaint (to allege inability to agree and that sale would promote his interest) | Wyckoff argued amendments were untimely, futile, and prejudicial | Bowyer contended amendments showed inability to agree and satisfaction of statutory promotion element | Court did not abuse discretion: one proposed amendment sought to plead the court’s erroneous fourth factor (irrelevant), the other was untimely and concerned an element Bowyer should have asserted earlier; denial affirmed |
| Whether summary judgment was improperly granted to respondents | Wyckoff maintained summary judgment was proper because Bowyer failed to prove statutory prerequisites for partition by sale/allotment | Bowyer argued errors in legal standards and denial of amendment prejudiced his ability to oppose summary judgment | Court affirmed summary judgment because Bowyer failed to establish entitlement under § 37-4-3 and did not challenge that alternative basis on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Smith, 180 W. Va. 203, 376 S.E.2d 97 (1988) (defines partition by allotment when partition in kind is inconvenient)
- Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley, 161 W. Va. 782, 247 S.E.2d 712 (1978) (sets three statutory elements required to compel partition by sale)
- Perdue v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 152 W. Va. 222, 161 S.E.2d 250 (1968) (trial court has sound discretion to grant or deny leave to amend pleadings)
- State ex rel. Vedder v. Zakaib, 217 W. Va. 528, 618 S.E.2d 537 (2005) (lack of diligence and unreasonable delay can justify denial of leave to amend)
- Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965) (appellate courts may affirm lower court judgment on any correct legal ground disclosed by the record)