291 So.3d 344
Miss.2020Background
- David Dickerson was indicted for capital murder, arson, and armed robbery; a jury convicted him and recommended death; convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Pretrial competency proceedings involved three examiners who testified Dickerson met the Dusky competency standard; trial proceeded in 2012.
- Dickerson filed post-conviction relief and claimed he was incompetent to proceed; the Supreme Court remanded for a competency determination for post-conviction proceedings.
- A 2018 competency hearing admitted expert testimony from Dr. Robert Storer (concluding competence) and Dr. Malcolm Spica (mixed report; testified but report indicated incompetence); the trial court found Dickerson competent to proceed.
- Dickerson appealed the competency finding, arguing (1) the finding was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence (challenging Dr. Storer’s methods and urging that Dr. Spica’s report was improperly excluded) and (2) the court should have applied the Dusky/Gammage standard exclusively.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s competency finding was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence | Dickerson: trial court erred by relying on Dr. Storer, who misdiagnosed/remissive schizophrenia, minimized executive-function deficits, and used improper testing | State: Dr. Storer was qualified; his methods and conclusions were reliable; prior competency rulings and res judicata apply | Court affirmed — finding not manifestly against overwhelming weight; trial court could credit Dr. Storer’s evaluation |
| Admissibility/consideration of Dr. Spica’s written report | Dickerson: court failed to admit and rule on Dr. Spica’s report and should have relied on it | State: failure to obtain a ruling waived the issue; trial court nonetheless reviewed Dr. Spica’s report; any failure to rule was harmless | Court found waiver but concluded the trial court considered Spica’s report; any error was harmless |
| Proper competency standard for post-conviction proceedings (Dusky/Gammage) | Dickerson: only the Dusky/Gammage standard applies to competency at all stages, including post-conviction | State: no established constitutional right to competency in post-conviction; alternative standards can apply | Court declined to resolve whether Dusky is the exclusive standard but held the trial court’s findings met any of the proffered or recognized standards; affirmed |
| Whether specialized testing (e.g., MacCAT-CA) or executive-function deficits required finding of incompetence | Dickerson: Dr. Storer should have used MacCAT-CA; executive dysfunction is sufficient to show incompetence | State: MacCAT-CA is aimed at trial competency; no standard instrument exists for post-conviction competence; deficits alleged were not shown severe enough; prior findings control | Court held Dr. Storer’s methods (including PAI) were adequate for post-conviction competence evaluation; deficits not shown to render Dickerson incompetent |
Key Cases Cited
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (U.S. 1960) (establishes competency standard used at trial: ability to consult with counsel and a factual and rational understanding of proceedings)
- Gammage v. State, 510 So. 2d 802 (Miss. 1987) (applies Dusky standard in Mississippi)
- Dickerson v. State, 175 So. 3d 8 (Miss. 2015) (Dickerson’s direct-appeal decision affirming competency finding and convictions)
- Beasley v. State, 136 So. 3d 393 (Miss. 2014) (standard for appellate review: findings on competency will not be reversed unless manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence)
- Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722 (Miss. 2008) (recognizes that serious mental illness, including schizophrenia, does not per se render a defendant incompetent)
- Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (addresses competency in the context of waiving collateral review; cited regarding limits of precedent on post-conviction competency)
- Franklin v. Lovitt Equip. Co., Inc., 420 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1982) (where a trial court reserved ruling but clearly considered evidence, appellate court assumed the evidence was considered)