44 F.4th 1209
9th Cir.2022Background
- David Demarest, visiting California, drove into a Vallejo DUI checkpoint that was marked and conducted under an Operation Plan; signs announced both DUI and driver’s license checks.
- Officer Jodi Brown asked Demarest for his license; Demarest refused on the asserted Fourth Amendment ground that the request was unlawful and asked to be let through.
- Officer Brown removed Demarest from the car, handcuffed and arrested him; county later dismissed criminal charges after diversion.
- Demarest sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging: (1) unlawful detention at the checkpoint (license checks made the stop unreasonable), (2) arrest without probable cause, (3) excessive force, and (4) municipal liability under Monell.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Officer Brown and the City; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether adding routine license checks to a DUI checkpoint renders the seizure unlawful | Demarest: License checks at a DUI checkpoint unreasonably prolong seizure and are not justified by the checkpoint’s primary (drunk-driving) purpose | City: License checks are a permissible, minimal adjunct to a lawful DUI checkpoint and advance roadway safety | Held: Objectively reasonable; license checks are appropriately tailored, minimally intrusive, and may be considered because they advance permissible safety interests |
| 2. Whether arrest for refusing to produce a license lacked probable cause | Demarest: Officer Brown lacked probable cause because she wasn’t enforcing another Vehicle Code provision that justified demanding the license | Brown/City: A lawful sobriety checkpoint is an enforcement of the Vehicle Code (Cal. Veh. Code § 2814.2), so refusal to produce a license violates Cal. Veh. Code § 12951(b) | Held: Once Demarest refused, officer had probable cause to arrest under California law; arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment |
| 3. Whether Officer Brown used excessive force in removing/arresting Demarest | Demarest: Physical removal aggravated his back injury and handcuffing was excessive | Brown/City: Force was minimal, objectively reasonable to effect arrest, and there was no evidence she knew of a disabling back condition | Held: Use of force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law; not excessive |
| 4. Whether the City is liable under Monell for customs, training, or policy | Demarest: City ratified or failed to train/supervise officers leading to constitutional violations | City: No underlying constitutional violation by Brown, so no municipal liability | Held: Monell claim fails because plaintiff did not establish an underlying constitutional violation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (upheld limited suspicionless immigration checkpoints on balance-of-interests grounds)
- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (roving, suspicionless license checks unconstitutional; distinguished fixed checkpoints)
- Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (upheld sobriety checkpoints as minimally intrusive and serving significant public interest)
- City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (struck down checkpoints whose primary purpose is general crime control)
- Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (information-seeking checkpoints may be reasonable under an individual-circumstances test)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness is generally an objective inquiry)
- Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (subjective intent irrelevant; analyze objective effect for Fourth Amendment claims)
- Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (state law restrictions do not alter Fourth Amendment reasonableness for arrests)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (excessive-force claims governed by Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (factors for assessing force include need, amount used, injuries, and perceived threat)
