David Danser v. Patricia Stansberry, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12623

Danser, a federal prisoner, was assaulted in the SHU recreation area after being placed in a cage with Gustin, a violent gang member, while Boyd left the area unsupervised.
The SHU Report used by Boyd did not contain Danser’s sex-offender status or gang affiliations; this information was in separate CIM/Sentry databases not necessarily consulted by Boyd.
Danser alleged deliberate indifference to safety by Boyd, Stansberry, and Roy, seeking damages under Bivens for Eighth Amendment violations.
The district court denied qualified-immunity summary judgment; the case proceeded to appeal on whether the officials were entitled to immunity as a matter of law.
The SHU post required supervising inmates at all times; the incident occurred when Boyd was away from the recreation cages for a period of time.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held the district court erred in denying qualified immunity and vacated/remanded for judgment in the defendants’ favor.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Boyd have a cognizable deliberate-indifference state of mind?	Danser argues Boyd knew or should have known of excessive risk by pairing Danser with Gustin and leaving area unsupervised.	Boyd contends there is no evidence he knew Gustin posed a specific risk or that separation orders were apparent.	No, immunity granted; no evidence of deliberate indifference.
Are Stansberry and Roy entitled to qualified immunity?	Danser contends tacit authorization based on supervisors’ inaction creates liability.	Stansberry and Roy did not have personal involvement or knowledge of a systemic risk; no direct culpability.	Yes, they are entitled to qualified immunity.
Was the district court’s denial of summary judgment properly reviewed under collateral order doctrine?	Danser asserts appellate review should reweigh facts; issues are legal.	Court can review law questions at summary judgment stage without reweighing facts.	We have jurisdiction to decide the law, and vacate/remand for judgment in defendants’ favor on qualified immunity.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (U.S. 1994) (deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment prison conditions claims)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (two-step qualified immunity analysis (original sequence))
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (modification allowing not to apply sequence of Saucier test)
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008) (reiterates de novo review and standard for qualified immunity)
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (U.S. 2010) (significance of core inquiry in excessive force cases; distinction from deliberate indifference)
Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment evidentiary standards in civil cases)
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1999) (deliberate indifference standard requires actual knowledge of risk)
Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720 (4th Cir. 2010) (significant injury requirement in Eighth Amendment analysis)
Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984) (tacit authorization theory for supervisor liability)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (rejection of respondeat superior theory in Bivens context; basic pleading standard)
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (liability for supervisors under Bivens requires direct culpability)
Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2013) (collateral-order review of qualified-immunity rulings; de novo standard)