David Cupello v. State of Indiana, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 144

Cupello, an apartment resident, spoke with management; after a hallway encounter he cursed at staff, who called off-duty Pike Township Constable Robert Webb (a courtesy officer for the complex) to investigate reports of intimidation.
Webb went to Cupello’s apartment, knocked, and when Cupello opened the inward-swinging door Webb placed his foot inside the threshold (he had no warrant and did not clearly identify himself as acting in an official capacity).
Cupello closed the door; because Webb’s foot blocked the threshold the door struck Webb multiple times. Webb then announced an arrest for battery on an officer, called backup, obtained a key from management, entered without a warrant, and arrested Cupello.
The State charged Cupello with battery on a law enforcement officer (Class A misdemeanor). At a bench trial the court found Webb was acting in his official capacity and that Cupello acquiesced to Webb’s presence at the door, and convicted.
On appeal the court considered (1) whether Webb was engaged in official duties when injured, and (2) whether Cupello’s affirmative statutory Castle Doctrine defense (I.C. § 35-41-3-2(i)(2)) justified his use of force to prevent an unlawful entry.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State proved Webb was engaged in official duties when Cupello struck him	State: Webb responded to a complaint of intimidation to enforce law and maintain public peace; prior dealings made Webb’s status known to Cupello	Cupello: Webb was acting only as a private courtesy officer for the apartment complex, not in official law‑enforcement capacity	Held: Sufficient evidence that Webb was performing official duties; the State met both prongs (nature of act + citizen knew/should have known Webb was acting as an officer)
Whether Cupello’s use of force was justified under the Castle Doctrine when Webb entered the threshold	Cupello: Webb’s placement of his foot inside the threshold was an unlawful entry; under I.C. § 35-41-3-2(i)(2) Cupello could use reasonable force to prevent/terminate it	State: Cupello consented/acquiesced by conversing at the door or reasonably believed Webb acted lawfully; also Cupello didn’t know Webb had placed his foot before first slam	Held: Webb’s breach of the threshold was an unlawful entry; conversation at the door is not consent; Cupello discovered the obstruction when attempting to close the door and reasonably used force to terminate the entry—affirmative defense established; conviction reversed

Barnes v. State, 953 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 2011) (addressing limits of Castle Doctrine as a defense to offenses against officers and prompting legislative amendment)
Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1999) (Fourth Amendment threshold rule: officers may not cross home threshold absent warrant or exigent circumstances)
Williams v. State, 873 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (any breach of the threshold, however slight, can constitute residential entry)
Tapp v. State, 406 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (off‑duty officer’s duty status depends on the nature of acts performed and whether officer identified status)
Nieto v. State, 499 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (off‑duty officer enforcing peace may be performing official duties where citizen knew officer’s status)
Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (officer’s placement of foot in doorway and subsequent entry rendered arresting conduct unlawful; resisting conviction reversed)
Harper v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (officer’s ruse to gain entry is comparable to physically preventing door closure for warrantless entry)
Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. 1998) (opening the door to inquire is not an invitation to enter; homeowner may exclude visitors)
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (U.S. 1976) (distinguished: public‑space arrest culminating inside home where entry followed a visible police announcement)