David Cruz v. Greg Abbott
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3280
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2015 Texas amended its human-smuggling statute (HB 11 § 14(a)(2)) to criminalize knowingly encouraging or inducing a person to enter or remain in the U.S. in violation of federal law by "concealing, harboring, or shielding that person from detection" for a pecuniary benefit.
- Plaintiffs: two landlords (Cruz, Reyes) who rent to persons regardless of immigration status, RAICES Executive Director Jonathan Ryan, and the Ozanam Center sheltering individuals regardless of immigration status; plaintiffs claim they could be criminally liable under § 20.05.
- Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction alleging federal preemption and Fourteenth Amendment violations; the district court granted the injunction based on likely preemption success but dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims.
- Texas DPS Director McCraw filed an affidavit stating DPS would not investigate or prosecute the plaintiffs under the current statute; district court noted that statement does not bind local prosecutors.
- Defendants appealed the injunction arguing lack of Article III standing because plaintiffs face no credible threat of prosecution given the statute’s proper construction and McCraw’s statement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing via a credible threat of prosecution under HB 11 § 14(a)(2) | Plaintiffs contend "harboring...from detection" covers housing/sheltering undocumented immigrants who receive money or labor, so they face imminent prosecution | Defendants say the statute targets active concealment from authorities (covertness), not ordinary renting or providing social services, so no credible threat exists | Plaintiffs lack standing; no credible threat where mere sheltering/renting does not constitute "harboring...from detection" |
| How to interpret "harboring...from detection" in the Texas statute | Plaintiffs read "harboring" to mean "house" or "shelter," making ordinary sheltering proscribable | Court reads the phrase together: "from detection" requires covertness or efforts to hide persons from authorities, not mere housing | "Harboring...from detection" requires concealment beyond ordinary sheltering |
| Whether federal precedents (and analogous statutes) support plaintiffs’ broader reading | Plaintiffs cite Ninth and Eleventh Circuit decisions suggesting sheltering can suffice for standing | Defendants rely on Fifth Circuit and other circuit decisions construing similar federal language to require concealment to avoid detection | Court follows narrower Fifth Circuit line: the phrase targets hiding/ shielding from authorities, not mere provision of shelter |
| Effect of DPS Director’s affidavit on standing | Plaintiffs argue enforcement risk remains despite affidavit | Defendants note the affidavit reduces credible threat of state-level enforcement though it may not bind local prosecutors | Court gives McCraw’s statement weight and finds plaintiffs have not shown they took steps to help aliens evade detection, supporting lack of standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (explains standing doctrine and credible-threat standard for pre-enforcement suits)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (pre-enforcement suits may proceed where credible threat of prosecution exists)
- Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreted Arizona statute; held sheltering/transportation supported standing in that context)
- Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (held plaintiff had standing where activities included transport and assistance that could facilitate evasion)
- United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981) (construed "harboring...from detection" as hiding from authorities)
- Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. en banc 2013) (reaffirmed the Fifth Circuit’s reading of similar statutory language)