David Clark and April Clark v. Paddington British Private School, Inc. and Nicolette Hardwicke, 09-16-00056-CV

Appellants David and April Clark filed a TCPA motion to dismiss claims brought by Paddington British Private School and Nicolette Hardwicke.
At the dismissal hearing the trial judge orally announced she would deny the TCPA motion, cited perceived evidence of defamation, asked the parties to prepare a written order, and indicated she would sign it the following Friday; the denial also was noted on the court docket the same day.
The trial court never signed a written order denying the motion.
The Clarks filed an interlocutory appeal under the TCPA provisions allowing appeals from denials of TCPA motions; appellees challenged this court’s jurisdiction because there was no signed order.
The Court of Appeals reviewed TCPA §27.008(a) (operation-of-law denials), §27.008(b) and §51.014(a)(12) (statutory interlocutory appeals), and Texas appellate rules requiring a signed order to begin the appeal clock.
The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because there was no signed written order authorizing an interlocutory appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an oral ruling by the trial court that denies a TCPA motion is an appealable order when no written order is signed	Clark: oral denial demonstrates the court ruled; therefore appealable and not overruled by operation of law	School: interlocutory appeal under §51.014/§27.008(b) requires a signed written order; without it no appeal	Held: No jurisdiction — oral ruling without a signed order is not an appealable order for §51.014/§27.008(b) purposes
Whether §27.008(a) (operation-of-law denial) provides jurisdiction when the court actually ruled orally but did not sign an order	Clark: where the court actually ruled, a signed order is unnecessary and the motion should not be deemed denied by operation of law	School: §27.008(a) applies only when the court fails to rule in time; here the court did rule, so operation-of-law denial is inapplicable	Held: §27.008(a) inapplicable because the trial court did rule; thus that provision does not supply jurisdiction here

Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 422 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. 2012) (general limits on interlocutory appeal jurisdiction)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (final-judgment rule and interlocutory exceptions)
CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (strict application of interlocutory-appeal statutes)
Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (interpreting TCPA interlocutory provisions narrowly)
KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (interlocutory appeal proper from written order denying TCPA motion)
Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. 1995) (appellate timetables begin only from a signed, written order)
Inwood Forest Cmty. Improvement Ass’n v. Arce, 485 S.W.3d 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015) (distinguishing oral indications of future rulings from operative rulings)
Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012) (discussing when a court has "ruled" for TCPA timing purposes)
Brashear v. Victoria Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009) (dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when record does not affirmatively show jurisdiction)