62 F.4th 278
6th Cir.2023Background
- J.M. Smucker Co., a long‑time federal contractor, adopted a COVID‑19 vaccine mandate for U.S. employees in 2021 after the President issued an Executive Order directing federal contractors to ensure employees were vaccinated while recognizing legally entitled health or religious accommodations.
- Smucker’s initially framed vaccination as an expectation, then implemented a formal mandate consistent with federal contractor guidance and said it would consider sincerely held religious‑belief exemptions.
- Four Smucker’s employees (Ciraci, Grosjean, Morr, Adams) sought religious exemptions; Smucker’s denied their requests.
- The employees sued Smucker’s under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause; the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Smucker’s is not a state actor for purposes of the Free Exercise claim because contracting with the federal government and complying with the Executive Order, without more, does not transform a private employer into the government.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smucker’s actions in denying religious exemptions are "state action" under the Free Exercise Clause | Smucker’s acted as a federal actor when it implemented the contractor vaccine mandate and denied exemptions, so the First Amendment applies | Smucker’s remained a private actor; contracting with the federal government and complying with the Executive Order does not make it the State | Smucker’s is not a state actor; First Amendment claim fails against private employer |
| Whether compliance with a generally applicable federal law or status as a federal contractor converts private conduct into state action | The Executive Order and contractor status effectively compelled Smucker’s to deny exemptions, linking Smucker’s decisions to the government | Compliance with federal law or being a federal contractor alone does not create state action | Compliance/contractor status alone is insufficient to establish state action |
| Whether the government coerced or significantly encouraged Smucker’s decision‑making (coercion/entwinement) | The federal policy and deadlines coerced Smucker’s to adopt the mandate and to deny accommodations | The Executive Order left discretion to contractors to evaluate and grant legally entitled exemptions; no coercion or joint action is alleged | No coercion or entwinement shown as to the specific denial decisions; Blum controls |
| Availability of remedies and causes of action (§ 1983, Bivens, equitable relief) | Plaintiffs seek declaratory, reinstatement, and other relief under the First Amendment | § 1983 applies to state actors only; Bivens is disfavored and limited; equitable remedies may be constrained and were not briefed | § 1983 inapplicable (federal actor alleged); Bivens extension unlikely; equitable/affirmative relief questions left undecided by the court |
Key Cases Cited
- Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) (being regulated or subject to government control does not by itself make a private entity a state actor)
- Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (state‑action inquiry asks whether challenged conduct is "fairly attributable" to the government)
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (broad statutory directives that leave private actors significant discretion do not render private decisions state action)
- Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (entwinement/nexus between private actor and government can create state action)
- Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (heavy regulation of a private utility does not automatically convert private action into state action)
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (government‑compelled private searches can be attributable to the government)
- Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (private actor may be state actor when it conspires or acts jointly with state officials)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (creates limited implied cause of action against federal officers)
- Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (declines to extend Bivens to private corporations)