904 F.3d 623
8th Cir.2018Background
- In 1996 David Barnett murdered his grandparents; convicted in 1997 and sentenced to death; Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.
- Barnett filed a state post-conviction Rule 29.15 motion alleging trial counsel failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence about his background; the state court rejected the motion as procedurally deficient (pleadings failed to identify witnesses/availability).
- Barnett then sought federal habeas relief (28 U.S.C. § 2254); federal district court initially denied relief and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in 2008, holding Missouri’s procedural rule to be an adequate and independent state ground.
- After Martinez v. Ryan (2012), Barnett moved under Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) to reopen; the district court held an evidentiary hearing limited to Ground I (ineffective assistance at penalty phase for failing to investigate/present mitigating evidence) and found both state post-conviction counsel and trial counsel ineffective, granting habeas relief and ordering life without parole or a new penalty-phase trial.
- The State (Roper) appealed, challenging the district court’s use of Martinez, the finding of ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel, the scope of Rule 60(b) relief (successive-petition concerns), and denial of Roper’s Rule 59(e) motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barnett) | Defendant's Argument (Roper) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez justified reopening the case / Rule 60(b) extraordinary-circumstances finding | Martinez supplies cause to overcome procedural default because state post-conviction counsel was ineffective; equitable relief warranted | Treating Martinez as an extraordinary circumstance is error; many precedents reject reopening | Court’s 2013 Martinez-based partial grant is not before this appeal; appellate court declines to review that specific Rule 60(b) extraordinary-circumstances finding here |
| Whether state post-conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland, supplying cause to reach the trial- counsel claim | Post-conviction counsel drafted pleadings so technically deficient that, combined with testimony, performance fell below objective standard and prejudiced Barnett (denied evidentiary hearing) | State argued the procedural ruling was correct and adequate; no cause to excuse default | Appellate court affirms district court: post-conviction counsel was ineffective under Strickland and prejudice established, so cause exists to reach merits |
| Whether the Rule 60(b) proceeding impermissibly raised a successive habeas claim by expanding Ground I (scope/jurisdiction under AEDPA) | The 60(b) motion challenged the procedural bar that prevented merits review of original Ground I; the evidentiary hearing was by consent and did not present a new successive claim | The district court exceeded jurisdiction by addressing evidence beyond petitioner’s biological-family allegation; such expansion would create a successive petition under § 2244(b) | Court holds Ground I was never addressed on the merits before; Rule 60(b) motion attacked the procedural bar and, as to Ground I, was not a successive petition under § 2244(b) |
| Whether the district court erred in denying Roper’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter/amend the judgment | Barnett’s grant was erroneous due to legal mistakes and manifest errors | Roper argued fundamental errors justified altering judgment | Court finds no manifest error; denial of Rule 59(e) was proper and judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (creates narrow equitable exception: ineffective postconviction counsel can be cause to excuse procedural default of trial-ineffective-assistance claims)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (federal habeas courts generally barred from reviewing claims defaulted on independent and adequate state grounds; attorney error in state postconviction proceedings is not usually cause)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (limits use of Rule 60(b) in habeas; distinguishes attacks on merits from attacks on procedural integrity of earlier habeas proceeding)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (applies Martinez where state law requires initial review collateral proceedings for ineffectiveness claims)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (interpretation of AEDPA should consider comity, finality, and federalism; caution against interpretations that foreclose federal review)