David Bald v. Wells Fargo Bank, 688 F. App'x 472

Plaintiffs David Bald and Emily Lelis (putative class) sued Wells Fargo under HRS § 480-2 alleging unfair or deceptive trade practices tied to nonjudicial foreclosures of their homes.
Plaintiffs complained of two practices: (1) foreclosure sale notices advertising only a quitclaim deed though Wells Fargo sometimes conveyed a limited warranty deed; and (2) postponing foreclosure auctions by oral/public announcement without publishing a new notice.
District court dismissed, ruling Hawaii foreclosure statute did not mandate deed form, allowed postponement by announcement, and declined to apply the common‑law mortgagee duty argued by Plaintiffs.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit held Plaintiffs had consumer standing under HRS § 480-1 because the loans funded personal residential purchases.
The court found Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that both practices could violate the mortgagee’s common‑law duties (Silva/Ulrich/Hungate) to conduct sales reasonably to obtain the best price, and thus could be “unfair” under HRS § 480-2.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, concluding questions of fairness are factual and not resolved as a matter of law at the pleading stage.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing under HRS § 480-1	Purchases of residential property via loan make them "consumers."	Plaintiffs are not consumers for Wells Fargo under HRS § 480-1.	Plaintiffs have consumer standing; underlying transactions were personal residential investments.
Advertising only quitclaim deeds	Advertising quitclaim deeds when warranty deeds were sometimes provided depressed sale value and violated mortgagee duties.	Statute HRS § 667-5 does not prescribe deed form; no per se violation.	Allegations suffice to raise a factual question whether the practice was unfair under common law duties; dismissal premature.
Postponement by announcement (no published notice)	Mortgage power‑of‑sale clause required published notice for postponement; announcement-only practice breached contract and could reduce price.	HRS § 667-5 permits postponement by announcement; announcement is sufficient.	Where mortgage clause requires published notice, announcement-only postponement can violate the clause and common‑law duty; factual issue for remand.
Pleading standard for HRS § 480-2 injury	Plaintiffs alleged resulting injury/damages from practices; no fraud alleged.	Claims should meet Rule 9(b) heightened fraud pleading because § 480-2 is fraud‑based.	No heightened Rule 9(b) pleading required for unfair‑practice claims; Plaintiffs pleaded injury sufficiently at this stage.

Kapunakea Partners v. Equilon Enters. LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Haw. 2009) (interpreting HRS § 480-2 and relation to common‑law duties)
Hungate v. Law Office of David B. Rosen, 391 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2017) (mortgagee duties in nonjudicial foreclosure; consumer standing under HRS § 480-1)
State by Bronster v. U.S. Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294 (Haw. 1996) (distinguishing unfair and deceptive prongs under HRS § 480-2)
Silva v. Lopez, 5 Haw. 262 (Haw. 1884) (early common‑law rule limiting mortgagee conduct to avoid oppression of debtor)
Ulrich v. Security Investment Co., 35 Haw. 158 (Haw. 1900s) (mortgagee duty to use reasonable diligence to secure best price at foreclosure)
Albice v. Premier Mortg. Servs. of Wash., Inc., 276 P.3d 1277 (Wash. 2012) (continuances/postponements can depress foreclosure sale price)
Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (Rule 9(b) inapplicable to non‑fraud unfair practice claims)