David Anthony Jordan v. State of Indiana, 60 N.E.3d 1062

In 2001 Jordan pled guilty to multiple offenses and received an aggregate 20-year sentence; he pursued appeals and post-conviction petitions over subsequent years.
Judge Thomas Newman originally presided; he recused in January 2013 and Special Judge Dennis Carroll was assigned, but Newman continued to hold hearings and sign orders in the case.
In September 2014 Newman ordered Jordan into work release; in July 2015 Newman converted Jordan’s remaining sentence to probation—Jordan did not object or appeal that order.
The State filed a probation-violation notice in August 2015 alleging new crimes and other violations; an evidentiary revocation hearing was held October 1, 2015 before Special Judge Carroll.
Carroll found Jordan had violated probation and ordered him to serve 12 years of his previously suspended sentence; Jordan appealed only challenging the judges’ authority and counsel’s effectiveness (not the violation proof or sanction).

Issue	Jordan's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Special Judge Carroll had authority to enter the revocation order	Carroll lacked authority because Newman had reassumed jurisdiction	Jordan waived the challenge by not objecting at the revocation hearing	Waived — failure to object at trial forfeits appellate review (Floyd)
Whether Judge Newman had authority to place Jordan on probation after recusal	Newman’s probation order was invalid because he had recused	Jordan waived collateral attack by failing to object or appeal the July 2015 probation order	Waived — collateral challenge unavailable on subsequent appeal from revocation
Whether revocation counsel was ineffective for not challenging probation’s validity	Counsel was deficient for failing to object to Newman’s authority; prejudice because Carroll might have vacated Newman’s orders	Probation revocation counsel need only meet civil (lesser) effectiveness standard; Jordan had counsel and a procedurally fair hearing	No ineffective assistance — under civil/Baum standard counsel’s performance was adequate
Whether Sixth Amendment standard (Strickland) applies to revocation-counsel claims	Jordan invoked Strickland	State argued no Sixth Amendment right in revocation; due process and statutory counsel right govern	Court applied civil/Baum standard (not Strickland) and alternatively said Strickland would not change outcome

Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28 (Ind. 1994) (failure to object in trial court waives challenge to authority of court officer)
Bivins v. State, 485 N.E.2d 89 (Ind. 1985) (failure to object to special-judge appointment results in waiver)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation is not a stage of prosecution; no automatic Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in all revocation proceedings)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases)
Childers v. State, 656 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (applies lesser civil standard when reviewing claims of ineffective assistance in probation revocation)
Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 1989) (less rigorous standard for counsel performance in civil post-conviction settings)
Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 2008) (due process limits on revocation; minimum procedural protections required)