David Allen Parker v. Mark Williamson, Warden, 16-0213

In 2001 David Allen Parker (then 17) pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life with mercy.
Parker filed a habeas petition in 2002; after an omnibus evidentiary hearing in January 2009 the circuit court denied relief and entered findings explaining why claims failed.
In January 2016 Parker filed a second habeas petition raising (among other things) ineffective assistance of habeas counsel and a due‑process challenge to the Parole Board’s denial of parole under juvenile‑offender considerations.
The circuit court found most claims were previously raised and adjudicated (res judicata) except the Parole Board issue, and declined to grant relief on any claim.
This Court affirmed, holding (1) Parker failed to show habeas counsel performed deficiently under Strickland/Miller and (2) the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion or deny Parker a meaningful opportunity for parole under the juvenile‑offender statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance of habeas counsel at 2009 omnibus hearing	Habeas counsel failed to investigate, prepare, or call witnesses, rendering representation deficient	Circuit/State: petitioner offers only general allegations and no evidence of deficient performance or prejudice; prior hearing record shows considered disposition	Denied — petitioner failed to show counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable or prejudicial under Strickland/Miller
Preclusion/res judicata of issues raised in second petition	Parker sought to relitigate matters he raised earlier	State: prior omnibus habeas hearing is res judicata for matters raised or that could have been raised; only limited exceptions apply	Court held most claims were previously finally adjudicated or waived and therefore barred
Due process/liberty interest re: Parole Board denial (juvenile‑offender considerations)	Parole denial ignored appropriate factors (maturity, rehabilitation, lack of violent propensity) and denied a meaningful opportunity for release under WV Code §62‑12‑13b	Board reviewed educational/court records, program participation, age/immaturity, and determined Parker was not a suitable parole candidate; parole decisions are discretionary	Denied — record shows Board considered required factors and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously; no abuse of discretion shown

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3 (1995) (adopts Strickland standard for West Virginia criminal matters)
Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417 (2006) (standard of review for habeas corpus appeals)
State ex rel. Franklin v. McBride, 226 W.Va. 375 (2009) (appellate review principles cited)
Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W.Va. 762 (1981) (one omnibus post‑conviction habeas hearing rule)
Rowe v. Whyte, 167 W.Va. 668 (1981) (parole decisions are discretionary but reviewable for arbitrary and capricious conduct)
Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183 (W.Va. 1980) (parole‑board abuse‑of‑discretion standard)
State ex rel. Daniel v. Legursky, 195 W.Va. 314 (1995) (court may dispose of ineffective‑assistance claim on either Strickland prong)