David Alan Jenkins v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
2016 Ky. LEXIS 327
| Ky. | 2016Background
- In 2005 Jane (then 17) stayed two nights with her grandmother and step-grandfather, David Jenkins; she later reported Jenkins forcibly performed oral sex on her and had intercourse the morning after the visit.
- Jane testified in detail at trial about nonconsensual oral-genital contact and intercourse; Jenkins denied any sexual contact and testified.
- Jenkins was indicted (2006) for first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy (forcible compulsion). Trial occurred in 2014; jury convicted on both counts and recommended consecutive 20-year terms (total 40 years).
- Trial evidence included: (1) Jane’s testimony of the 2005 incident and limited references to earlier similar abuse by Jenkins against Jane; (2) two short audio “snippets” from Jenkins’s post-polygraph interview in which he admitted fantasizing about Jane and conceded medication might make unconscious conduct possible.
- Jenkins moved for directed verdicts (denied); he appealed, arguing insufficient evidence, erroneous admission of prior-bad-acts and post-polygraph statements, erroneous exclusion of other interview portions, refusal to give a sexual-misconduct (misdemeanor) instruction, and that the sodomy instruction was duplicitous under Kentucky’s unanimity rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jenkins) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence / directed verdict (forcible compulsion) | Evidence did not prove "forcible compulsion" as defined by KRS (no physical force or threat producing fear of death/serious injury). | Jane’s testimony that Jenkins rolled her, removed her pajama pants, pushed aside attempts to block him, repeatedly said “no,” and was frightened sufficed for forcible compulsion. | Affirmed conviction for rape: viewed in light most favorable to prosecution, a rational juror could find forcible compulsion. |
| Duplicitous sodomy instruction / unanimous verdict | Instruction covered a single sodomy count though evidence showed two distinct sodomy acts; Jenkins argued jury unanimity violated. | Prosecutor treated the two acts as alternative bases for the one count. | Reversed sodomy conviction and corresponding sentence because the single-count instruction was duplicitous and violated Kentucky’s unanimity requirement; remanded. |
| Refusal to give sexual misconduct (misdemeanor) instruction | Sexual misconduct (KRS 510.140) is a lesser-included offense of rape; jury could have found intercourse without consent but without forcible compulsion. | Cooper and subsequent Kentucky precedent construe KRS 510.140 as limited (primarily) to certain age-based scenarios; statutory definitions of lack of consent point to forcible compulsion here, so sexual misconduct is not a lesser-included offense on these facts. | Denied: court held sexual misconduct is not a proper lesser-included instruction under these facts and Cooper remains controlling; no reversible error. |
| Admission of victim’s testimony about prior similar abuse (same-victim prior bad acts) | Such references invoked KRE 404(b) and were unduly prejudicial and character-based. | Same-victim prior-act evidence is highly probative on motive, context, and consent/forcible compulsion; the trial court limited scope and allowed cross-examination. | Admission upheld: trial court did not abuse discretion under the Bell three-part analysis (relevance, probative value, prejudice). |
| Admission of post-polygraph interview snippets and exclusion of other portions (KRE 106 & constitutional claim) | Playing snippets created a misleading impression; exclusion of related lines forced Jenkins to choose between presenting polygraph context or accepting an incriminating excerpt (constitutional dilemma). | Polygraph results are inadmissible but post-polygraph statements may be admissible if redacted; KRE 106 does not require admission of all surrounding material where excerpts are not misleading. | Admission of the limited excerpts and exclusion of other lines was not an abuse of discretion; no unconstitutional burden because Wyrick/Rogers permit use of post-polygraph interrogation evidence when properly managed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal sufficiency standard: conviction must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could find elements beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965) (lesser-included instruction doctrine: a lesser offense instruction is improper if factual issues are identical)
- Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (completeness doctrine: redacted excerpts that create misleading impressions may require admission of additional portions)
- Gibbs v. Commonwealth, 208 S.W.3d 848 (Ky. 2006) (forcible compulsion can be found without violent force; physical touching to compel sex may suffice)
- Johnson v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 439 (Ky. 2013) (duplicitous-count/unanimity rule under Kentucky Constitution)
- Kingrey v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 2013) (duplicitous instruction analysis; distinguishing combination instructions)
- Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29 (Ky. 2002) (polygraph evidence limited; post-polygraph statements may be admissible under constraints)
- Benham v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) (standard for directed verdict on appeal: only warranted if jury finding guilt would be clearly unreasonable)