533 P.3d 533
Alaska2023Background
- David and Rhetta Bragg purchased a 20‑acre lot that had earlier belonged to Wallace Cox; Cox assigned any claims arising from the property to the Braggs.
- Neighbor Timothy Teslow cut and mulched about 40 mature birch trees on the parcel in Aug. 2016; a recorded easement existed for a shared driveway near the cut area.
- The Braggs sued alleging encroachment (driveway and stone wall) and timber trespass under AS 09.45.730 (through Cox’s assignment); they later settled with Teslow’s wife and proceeded only against Teslow.
- Teslow moved for summary judgment; after some litigation the Braggs filed non‑oppositions and the superior court granted summary judgment in Teslow’s favor on all claims.
- The superior court awarded Teslow full attorney’s fees ($71,123, later supplemented) finding frivolous claims and improper purpose; the Braggs moved under Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b) to vacate the judgment, asserting their attorney’s mistaken advice — the court denied relief.
- Alaska Supreme Court: vacated the full‑fee awards and remanded for reconsideration (timber trespass claim had some merit and improper‑purpose finding was clearly erroneous) but affirmed denial of Rule 60(b) relief (attorney incompetence/inexcusable neglect is not a ground for relief under the circumstances).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bragg) | Defendant's Argument (Teslow) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether full (100%) attorney’s fees under Rule 82(b)(3) were warranted | Braggs: claims were made in good faith (timber trespass had merit via Cox’s assignment); they did not litigate to manufacture legislative sympathy | Teslow: claims were frivolous/vexatious and prosecuted with improper non‑judicial purpose; full fees protect prevailing parties | Vacated fee award and remanded — improper‑purpose finding clearly erroneous and timber trespass claim was not so baseless to infer bad faith; remand for further fee analysis |
| Whether summary judgment should be vacated under Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b) for counsel’s mistake/incompetence | Braggs: counsel mistakenly advised to not oppose summary judgment; this mistake warrants relief as an ‘‘injustice’’ | Teslow: counsel’s negligence is inexcusable neglect; remedy is malpractice action, not Rule 60(b) relief | Affirmed denial of 60(b) relief — attorney’s inexcusable neglect cannot be relieved under the ‘‘injustice’’ theory; Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires abandonment-level misconduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Johnson, 239 P.3d 393 (Alaska 2010) (full fees may be awarded only when claims are so lacking in merit that bad faith or vexatious conduct can be inferred)
- Chena Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. v. Bridges ex rel. S.B., 502 P.3d 951 (Alaska 2022) (attorney inexcusable neglect is not relieved by a judicial ‘‘injustice’’ exception to Rule 60(b); relief limited when counsel’s conduct is not abandonment)
- Sykes v. Lawless, 474 P.3d 636 (Alaska 2020) (standard of review for enhanced Rule 82 fee awards — abuse of discretion; review of claims’ viability often de novo)
- Allsop (State, Dep’t of Revenue, Child Support Enf’t Div. v. Allsop), 902 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1995) (full fee award requires claims be so devoid of merit that bad faith or vexatious intent may be inferred)
- Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1981) (timber trespass damages may include value of timber removed)
