Daves v. State
2011 WY 47
Wyo.2011Background
- Daves was convicted on 12 counts for kidnapping and sexual assault of his wife during an alleged divorce dispute.
- During deliberations, the jury asked for a definition of “used a firearm,” and the court prepared a written instruction.
- The district court allowed the instruction to be provided in writing after conferring with counsel, excluding the defendant from the conference.
- The court later provided additional instructions on “unlawfully confined.”
- The State prosecuted first-degree sexual assaults under a theory of submission obtained by threats to the victim, her boyfriend, or Daves himself, along with multiple gun-use counts; Daves was sentenced and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of ‘used a firearm’ | Daves argues Bailey limits this definition. | Daves contends the written instruction expanded beyond Bailey. | No clear error; instruction reasonable under Bailey and traditional interpretation. |
| Right to be present during supplemental instructions | Daves was not present for the conference and instruction in writing. | Presence required at all critical stages; absence prejudicial. | Not prejudicial under the facts; absence did not prejudice substantial rights. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for first-degree sexual assault | Prosecution theories supported by threats to victim, boyfriend, and Daves. | Cannot prove threats toward all three with reasonable belief in present ability. | Sufficient evidence to support all four first-degree sexual assault convictions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (defined ‘use’ of a firearm under § 924(c)(1) as active employment; mere possession not enough)
- Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720 (Wy. 1985) (presence at all stages; risk of prejudice from absent defendant during instruction)
- Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170 (Wy. 1998) (jury instruction conferences and presence requirements)
- Adams v. State, 79 P.3d 526 (Wy. 2003) (statutory interpretation of ‘anyone’ in threat-based sexual assault)
- Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wy. 1995) (when alternatives in a statute or theory are charged, evidence must support each)
- Tanner v. State, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wy. 2002) (related to Bush on multiple theories and sufficiency of evidence)