Davenport v. State, 690, 2015

Background

Defendant Frank Davenport pled no contest to manslaughter and a weapons charge under a plea agreement in which the State agreed not to seek more than a 10-year sentence; Davenport requested 5 years at sentencing, State requested 10.
Evidence at sentencing described a long, violent relationship with victim Holly Wilson, including prior charges (offensive touching, terroristic threatening), a standing no-contact order, eyewitness reports, police reports, photos, and videos.
The Superior Court found aggravating factors tied to Davenport's prior conduct toward Wilson, noted the no-contact order as "most significant," and imposed a 20-year sentence (half of the statutory maximum) and restitution to the Victim’s Compensation Assistance Program (VCAP).
Davenport appealed, arguing (1) the State breached the plea by urging a longer sentence via its sentencing materials, (2) the court relied on inaccurate/unsupported SENTAC aggravators in violation of due process, and (3) the court erred by ordering restitution to VCAP under an amended statute (arguing ex post facto/application error).
The Supreme Court reviewed whether any plea breach occurred, whether the sentencing relied on improperly applied SENTAC factors or unreliable information, and whether ordering VCAP restitution under the revised § 9014 constituted plain or ex post facto error.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
State breached plea by presenting materials urging a sentence at or above 10 years	Davenport: State engaged in a de facto breach by submitting materials that supported a lengthy sentence	State: It did not seek more than 10 years; presenting evidence to justify up to the agreed cap was permissible, especially since Davenport sought only 5 years	No breach; no plain error. State did not request >10 yrs and evidence was invited by Davenport's low request
Sentencing court relied on inaccurate or improperly applied SENTAC aggravators	Davenport: Court applied SENTAC-defined aggravators (prior violent conduct, repetitive conduct, victim vulnerability) without record support, violating due process	State: Court used the history of abuse as a single, discretionary aggravating circumstance; SENTAC is advisory and the record supported reliance on the abusive relationship	Affirmed. Court reasonably exercised discretion; use of SENTAC terms was rhetorical, not a flawed mechanistic application; evidence met minimal reliability standard
Ordering restitution to VCAP under amended § 9014 is plain error/ex post facto	Davenport: Restitution to VCAP under the amended statute imposed after‑the‑fact liability or otherwise was improper	State: A restitution requirement existed historically; the amendment clarified VCAP's ability to seek reimbursement and was in force at sentencing	No plain error. The amendment was procedural/clarifying as to whom VCAP could recover from and did not increase punishment; restitution authority existed historically

Key Cases Cited

Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839 (Del. 1992) (due‑process minimal indicium of reliability for sentencing information)
United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1982) (standard for reliability of sentencing information)
Russell v. State, 5 A.3d 622 (Del. 2010) (plain‑error preservation principles)
Siple v. State, 701 A.2d 79 (Del. 1997) (appellate courts lack jurisdiction to reverse solely because SENTAC guidelines were not followed)
State, Victims’ Compensation Assistance Program v. Chianese, 128 A.3d 628 (Del. 2015) (consider restitution authority as of time of hearing)
Snyder v. Andrews, 708 A.2d 237 (Del. 1998) (ex post facto analysis requires law to be retrospective and disadvantage the offender)
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997) (ex post facto principles on retrospective laws)
Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d 765 (Del. 1990) (preservation/plain‑error principles in criminal appeals)
Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296 (Del. 1989) (preservation/plain‑error standards)