Davenport v. Davenport
156 So. 3d 231
| Miss. | 2014Background
- Tammy and Dane Davenport divorced by irreconcilable differences after separation in 2007 following youth-court findings of abuse and multiple criminal trials that produced mixed results and dismissals; divorce decree entered in 2012.
- Tammy owned 75% and Dane 25% of Good Samaritan Physical Therapy, Inc. (GSPT); GSPT growth funded other businesses and real estate acquired during the marriage.
- After separation, Tammy continued to receive distributions from GSPT that were later reclassified as "loans to shareholder;" chancellor found substantial withdrawals (~$2.96M) used partly for failed business ventures and personal expenses.
- Court-appointed/agreeable accountants (Herrin, Boolos, Cummins) provided valuations; chancellor primarily accepted Herrin’s business and asset valuations.
- Chancellor awarded Dane 40% of business values (excluding lake house) and 50% of nonbusiness real and personal property; Dane’s total award was paid as lump-sum alimony (monthly installments over 180 months).
- Tammy appealed, raising challenges to valuation (debts), dissipation findings, exclusion/limitation of Boolos’s expert testimony, consideration of youth-court abuse findings and a youth-court brief, and the chancellor’s on-the-record analysis of Tammy’s ability to pay the alimony award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Davenport) | Defendant's Argument (Dane) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Valuation ignored marital liabilities | Court ignored $2,960,455 shareholder loan and other debts, inflating marital estate | Chancellor relied on agreed expert Herrin’s valuation and allocated debts to Tammy in decree | Affirmed: Chancellor may value businesses at divorce using Herrin’s report; decree makes Tammy responsible for business/nonbusiness debts. |
| 2. Withdrawals were legitimate, not dissipation | Withdrawals post-separation were legitimate expenses/investments, not wasteful dissipation | Chancellor found withdrawals and poor investments but made no finding of wasteful dissipation; used Ferguson factors | Affirmed: No abuse—chancellor did not find wasteful dissipation and properly considered withdrawals under Ferguson. |
| 3. Exclusion of Boolos’s expert testimony | Boolos should have been allowed to testify as an expert to challenge valuations and Tammy’s ability to pay | Dane moved to exclude Boolos as expert due to his post-separation role and partial advocacy; chancellor limited his role to fact witness | Affirmed: Boolos testified as fact witness after Tammy conceded his expected testimony was factual; Tammy showed no prejudice or differing expert opinion from Herrin. |
| 4. Weight to youth-court abuse findings | Chancellor failed to give proper weight to youth-court findings of child sexual abuse | Dane pointed to acquittals/dismissals in circuit court, limiting relevance for fault allocation | Affirmed: Chancellor admitted youth-court adjudication but treated fault as neutral given circuit outcomes; excluded youth-court brief but admitted adjudication order. |
| 5. Exclusion of youth-court judge’s brief | Brief should have been admitted to show facts underlying youth-court findings | Dane argued limited relevance; chancellor allowed the adjudication order instead | Affirmed: Chancellor acted within discretion—order admitted; brief excluded as cumulative. |
| 6. On-the-record ability-to-pay analysis for alimony | Chancellor failed to make Armstrong on-the-record findings re Tammy’s ability to pay $8,421.75/month | Dane argued lump-sum alimony served as equitable division under Ferguson, not periodic alimony requiring Armstrong analysis | Affirmed: Lump-sum award was a mechanism to equitably divide marital assets and was analyzed under Ferguson; no separate Armstrong on-the-record finding required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss. 1994) (sets factors for equitable division of marital property)
- MacDonald v. MacDonald, 698 So.2d 1079 (Miss. 1997) (chancellor discretion to value business at time of divorce and award interest via lump-sum alimony)
- Cuccia v. Cuccia, 90 So.3d 1228 (Miss. 2012) (marital debt must be considered in equitable division)
- Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278 (Miss. 1993) (factors for awarding periodic alimony and need for on-the-record analysis)
- Haney v. Haney, 907 So.2d 948 (Miss. 2005) (lump-sum alimony may be used as mechanism for equitable distribution; apply Ferguson/Cheatham factors)
- Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So.2d 843 (Miss. 2003) (distinguishes when Armstrong analysis is required post-property division)