272 So. 3d 69
La. Ct. App.2019Background
- Judicial election between Judge Marilyn Castle and Judge Jimmy Genovese featured heavy PAC-backed advertising after Citizens United enabled unlimited independent spending by corporations and unions.
- Castle's campaign ran a prominent November 6, 2016 newspaper ad naming specific plaintiff personal-injury lawyers (including Broussard & David) and accusing them of ‘‘unethically’’ using a PAC to support Genovese; Castle approved and paid for the ad.
- Broussard & David (relators) were later represented in a matter assigned to Judge Castle and timely moved to recuse under La. C.C.P. art. 151(A)(4), asserting the ad created a risk of bias against them.
- The judge randomly assigned to hear the motion denied it, applying a subjective "actual bias" standard and finding insufficient proof of actual bias.
- The appellate court granted the writ, held the trial judge erred by requiring proof of actual bias, and ordered Judge Castle recused under the objective due-process standard (Rippo/Caperton line).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether recusal must be decided using an objective due-process standard rather than proof of subjective actual bias | Broussard & David: Rippo/Caperton require an objective test—recusal is warranted if the probability of bias is too high for due process | State/Judge: Actual, subjective bias must be shown; ad alone insufficient | Court: Objective Rippo standard applies; trial court erred by requiring actual bias |
| Whether Castle’s campaign ad naming opposing lawyers created a constitutionally intolerable risk of bias | Relators: The ad’s tone, timing, content and Castle’s involvement would make a reasonable person doubt her impartiality toward those lawyers | Respondent: The ad was political speech in an election; prior conduct and lack of earlier recusal motions undermine the claim | Court: Under Rippo and related jurisprudence, the ad presented too high a risk of bias; recusal required |
| Whether campaign PAC contributions or the lawyers’ PAC activity justified the ad’s allegations | Relators: The ad singled out lawyers and accused them of unethical conduct, undermining judicial impartiality | Castle/defense: PAC contributions are lawful post-Citizens United; ad was campaigning and not per se unethical | Court: Legality of PAC contributions makes the ad’s accusations especially problematic for perceived impartiality; that factor supports recusal |
| Remedy: Appropriate relief after erroneous denial of recusal motion | Relators: Reverse and reassign case to a randomly allotted judge | Respondent: Deny recusal; keep case assigned | Court: Granted peremptory writ, reversed denial, ordered recusal and random reassignment |
Key Cases Cited
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holds corporations/unions are persons for First Amendment purposes and limits on independent political expenditures are restricted)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (due process forbids not only actual bias but even the probability of unfairness)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (extreme campaign-related influence can require recusal under Due Process)
- Rippo v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 905 (2017) (establishes objective probability-of-bias standard as the constitutionally required inquiry)
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (foundational Due Process precedent on judicial impartiality)
- LaCaze v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 60 (2017) (U.S. Sup. Ct. vacated state decision to ensure Rippo standard applied)
- State v. Daigle, 241 So.3d 999 (La. 2018) (Louisiana Supreme Court applied Rippo and found recusal required in that case)