Daugherty v. Commonwealth
467 S.W.3d 222
| Ky. | 2015Background
- Lisa Daugherty shot and killed her husband, Will Phelps; she was charged with murder and tampering with physical evidence (hiding the gun).
- Daugherty gave multiple inconsistent statements to medical personnel and police but consistently claimed the shooting occurred during a struggle and that Phelps ordered her to discard the gun because he was a felon.
- Police found the gun near a fence post; its serial number had been removed. Daugherty and Phelps had driven to the hospital instead of immediately summoning help.
- First trial (where evidence of Phelps’s felony was admitted) resulted in a mistrial; at retrial the trial court excluded testimony that Phelps was a felon and limited Daugherty’s testimony about statements Phelps made during the struggle; the jury convicted her of murder and tampering.
- On appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court held the trial court erred in excluding (1) evidence that Phelps was a convicted felon and (2) Daugherty’s testimony recounting Phelps’s threats, commands, and other statements, and that those errors infringed her right to present a defense.
Issues
| Issue | Daugherty's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of victim’s felony status | Relevant to explain why Phelps ordered the gun hidden and to rebut inference that hiding showed consciousness of guilt | Procedurally barred or irrelevant; if admissible it must fit specific rules for convictions (e.g., KRE 404(b), KRE 609) | Reversed: felony status was relevant, not barred by those rules, and exclusion was abuse of discretion |
| Admissibility of victim’s utterances (commands/threats/state-of-mind) | Statements were non-hearsay (commands/threats) or admissible under KRE 803(3); necessary context for defense | Either barred by hearsay or cumulative because similar statements were played by prosecution | Reversed: many statements were non-hearsay or fell under state-of-mind exception; exclusion under KRE 403 was improper |
| KRE 403 / cumulative-evidence rationale for exclusion | Defendant must be allowed to present her own testimony even if similar evidence had been elicited earlier; repetition by defendant has different context and is not necessarily cumulative | Admission in Commonwealth’s case made further repetition needless and cumulative | Reversed: exclusion as needlessly cumulative improperly limited defendant’s ability to present defense |
| Harmless-error and due-process impact | Exclusion deprived Daugherty of meaningful opportunity to present accidental-shooting defense; prior mistrial shows impact | Any errors were harmless given total evidence of guilt | Reversed: errors were constitutional and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Perry v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.3d 122 (Ky. 2012) (discussing inclusionary thrust of evidentiary rules)
- Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709 (Ky. 2004) (evidence of concealment creates inference of consciousness of guilt)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (right to present a defense/due process protections)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (standard on whether an error substantially influenced the verdict)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional error)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1993) (federal harmless-error standard reaffirmed)
- Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700 (Ky. 2005) (trial-court evidentiary-discretion standard)
- Brock v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1997) (limits on excluding cumulative evidence)
- Doneghy v. Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 95 (Ky. 2013) (duplicative evidence not automatically cumulative)
- Malone v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 121 (Ky. 2012) (inadmissibility of victim’s criminal record where irrelevant)