Daugherty v. City & Cnty. of S.F.
234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2018Background
- Federal corruption investigation (USAO-led) of SFPD plainclothes units began in 2011; IAD-Crim assisted under strict confidentiality and a federal protective order.
- Search warrants of Ian Furminger's phone (2011–2012) yielded thousands of text messages, including racist/sexist/homophobic/anti‑Semitic messages between Furminger and nine SFPD officers.
- IAD-Crim personnel discovered the offensive texts in or about December 2012 but did not disclose them to IAD-Admin because of USAO confidentiality requirements.
- Federal indictments issued in February 2014; Furminger was convicted December 5, 2014. On December 8, 2014 the USAO authorized release of the texts to IAD-Admin; administrative investigation and disciplinary notices followed in April 2015.
- Respondents sued under POBRA (§ 3300 et seq.), arguing the one‑year limitations period (§ 3304(d)(1)) began in December 2012 and thus discipline was untimely; trial court agreed and granted mandamus.
- Court of Appeal reversed: held (1) the limitations period did not accrue in Dec. 2012 because those who discovered the texts (IAD-Crim under USAO control) were not "persons authorized to initiate" POBRA investigations for disciplinary purposes; and (2) tolling (§ 3304(d)(2)(A)) applied while the texts were the subject of the federal criminal investigation/prosecution, so administrative action in April 2015 was timely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the one‑year POBRA limitations period began when IAD‑Crim discovered the texts (Dec 2012) | Respondents: discovery by Lt. DeFilippo/IAD‑Crim in Dec 2012 triggered §3304(d)(1) | SFPD/appellants: only IAD‑Admin (per department practice) were authorized to initiate POBRA disciplinary investigations, so accrual awaited IAD‑Admin receipt (Dec 2014) | Accrual did not occur in Dec 2012; discovery must be by a person authorized to initiate disciplinary investigations (IAD‑Admin here) |
| Whether an agency’s internal designation of who may initiate investigations is controlling | Respondents: General Order 1.06 authorizes senior officers like DeFilippo to initiate administrative investigations | Appellants: courts should apply the agency’s reasonable designation (IAD‑Admin) for who may initiate POBRA investigations | Agency designations are generally controlling; here evidence supports that IAD‑Admin— not DeFilippo—was authorized to initiate disciplinary investigations |
| Whether USAO confidentiality/protective orders prevented initiation of an administrative investigation | Respondents: DeFilippo could have initiated or sought relief to investigate despite confidentiality | Appellants: SFPD agreed to USAO restrictions; the texts were federal discovery subject to protective order, prohibiting disclosure and administrative investigation until released | Confidentiality restrictions were binding and prevented administrative investigation; secrecy was not abrogated by indictment and lasted until USAO released materials |
| Whether tolling under §3304(d)(2)(A) applies while the texts were "subject" of a criminal investigation/prosecution | Respondents: tolling does not apply because texts/subjects were not same as criminal charges against respondents | Appellants: the texts were examined and used as investigative tools in the federal conspiracy probe and remained subject to the criminal case and protective order, so tolling applies | Tolling applied from discovery (Dec 2012) through the criminal prosecution (ended at verdict Dec 5, 2014); administrative action in Apr 2015 was within one year after tolling ended |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. City of Los Angeles, 111 Cal.App.4th 899 (2003) (department procedures implementing POBRA relevant to accrual of limitations period)
- Benefield v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 171 Cal.App.4th 469 (2009) (look to agency operations/manual to determine who may initiate investigations)
- Parra v. City and County of San Francisco, 144 Cal.App.4th 977 (2006) (§3304(d)(2)(A) tolls limitations where criminal investigation encompassed misconduct at issue)
- Richardson v. City and County of San Francisco Police Commission, 214 Cal.App.4th 671 (2013) (tolling applies where criminal inquiry examined possible connection to administrative misconduct; no requirement of constant "active" investigation)
- Lucio v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal.App.4th 793 (2008) (tolling applies when noncriminal misconduct emerges during a criminal investigation)
- Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 7 Cal.4th 725 (1994) (procedural context for review and finality principles cited)
- Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco, 146 Cal.App.4th 1064 (2007) (statutory interpretation of POBRA; tolling and accrual issues)