Dassault Systemes,SA v. Childress, 2:09-cv-10534

Background

Plaintiff Dassault Systèmes develops CATIA software with trademarks and copyrights; Class 41 training mark registered in 2010 and CATIA V5 copyrights issued in 2003 and 2009.
Defendant Keith Childress operated a Detroit-area CATIA training school, using CATIA V4/V5 and leveraging relationships with IBM and MSC; the school was branded Practical Catia Training.
From 2001-2006, IBM/MSC supplied CATIA V5 licenses to the School (often via a single license) and Defendant used workarounds to allow multiple computers to run CATIA V5.
Plaintiff and IBM/MSC engaged in various arrangements (HEAT, EPP, banner ads, and vendor relationships) that facilitated Defendant’s use and promotion of CATIA V5, with Plaintiff eventually taking measures to protect IP rights.
A federal grand jury investigation followed a 2006 FBI seizure of the School’s materials; DOJ declined criminal prosecution in 2010, while civil litigation asserting copyright and trademark claims proceeded.
The case was litigated with multiple counterclaims by Defendant and four claims by Plaintiff; the court ultimately dismissed most counterclaims, leaving Count VII (abuse of process) surviving for trial, and addressed Plaintiff’s four claims in the complaint with mixed rulings on summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Plaintiff’s counterclaims I–XI should be dismissed.	Plaintiff contends many counterclaims fail pleading standards and lack viable legal theories.	Defendant argues some counterclaims survive based on sham litigation and disputed facts.	Counts I–VI and VIII–XI dismissed; Count VII survives.
Whether Defendant’s abuse of process claim (Count VII) can proceed.	Abuse of process lacks evident ulterior purpose or improper use of process as to bar the claim.	Plaintiff’s filings and DOJ actions show ulterior purpose and corroborating acts.	Abuse of process claim survives; triable issue remains.
Whether Plaintiff’s complaint on copyright/trademark/unfair competition/MCPA is time-barred by statute of limitations.	Claims accrued before 2006 may be time-barred; need assessment of knowledge and discovery.	Claims may have accrued earlier and be barred.
Statute of limitations issues exist; some claims not barred as to after-2006 conduct; pre-2006 issues for fact-finder.
Whether laches, acquiescence, estoppel, or implied license preclude Plaintiff’s claims.	Defendant’s defenses should bar claims entirely.	Defendant argues these defenses defeat claims.	Court denies summary judgment on these defenses; facts remain for trial.
Whether declaratory judgments on trademark cancellation/registration are viable.	Cancellation/registration sought by Defendant is improper under USPTO jurisdiction.	Court may determine right to registration and cancel registrations under 15 U.S.C. § 1119.	Count XI dismissed; no viable relief for cancellation/registration at this stage.

Key Cases Cited

Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (requires objective baselessness and anti-competitive motive to deem litigation as sham)
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (facially plausible claims required; mere speculation insufficient)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard governs pleading required for federal claims)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard requires movant to show absence of genuine dispute)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (pretrial burden-shifting and need for non-speculative evidence)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (mere metaphysical doubt insufficient; actual facts needed for genuine issue)
Early Detection Ctr., P.C. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 157 Mich.App. 618 (1986) (filing a lawsuit is not illegal or per se improper even if groundless)
Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2000) (standard for laches/acquiescence and equitable defenses in trademark)
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991) (acquiescence requires more than mere delay; estoppel elements)
Hensley Mfg., Inc. v. Propride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2009) (factors for likelihood of confusion in trademark disputes)