296 F. Supp. 3d 389
D.D.C.2017Background
- Plaintiffs Marcos DaSilva and Matteus Ferreira were full‑time delivery drivers who contracted with Border Transfer through single‑driver or small LLC motor‑carrier entities and were classified as independent contractors.
- Border Transfer is an FMCSA‑registered broker that contracts with motor carriers (via near‑uniform Contract Carrier Agreements, “CCAs”), requires drivers to attend daily stand‑ups at its Westwood, MA facility, wear uniforms, follow manifests and use a smartphone app to log deliveries.
- Plaintiffs allege misclassification under the Massachusetts Wage Act (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B) and challenge wage deductions (uniforms, insurance, damages, workers’ compensation) taken from drivers.
- Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of full‑time drivers in Massachusetts who were classified as independent contractors since June 23, 2013; defendants opposed on choice‑of‑law, individual incorporation inquiries, and predominance/individualized issues grounds.
- The court analyzed class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3), applying Massachusetts’ independent‑contractor statute (Prongs A, B, C), and First Circuit precedent that Prong B is preempted for motor carriers, leaving Prongs A and C at issue.
- The court concluded common issues (contractual and factual control, opportunity to run independent businesses, common deductions) predominate and certified the class, appointing the named plaintiffs and counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choice of law (applicability of Massachusetts law to all putative members) | Drivers’ relationship centers on Border Transfer’s Westwood, MA facility (daily stand‑ups), so MA law governs class claims | Some drivers/businesses located out of state; RI/CT wage law differs, so individualized choice‑of‑law inquiries required | Massachusetts law applies to all class members because their relationship "had no substantial relationship" to any place but Massachusetts (Dow v. Casale principle) |
| Prong A — contractual control (whether CCAs show common contractual control) | CCAs are standardized and contain common terms (uniforms, manifests, route/order requirements) so contractual control is resolvable classwide | Defendants dispute the extent of contractual control (merits) and say contracts vary in application | Contractual control is susceptible to common proof; examination of CCAs yields classwide answers |
| Prong A — actual control (day‑to‑day exercise of control) | Common practices (mandatory stand‑ups, manifests, uniforms, customer rating system) show Border Transfer exercised actual control across drivers | Defendants point to individualized facts (some drivers had flexibility; enforcement varied) requiring individual inquiries | Actual control is amenable to common proof; defendants’ affidavits do not defeat commonality or predominance |
| Prong C / Incorporation (independently established business and corporate form) | Whether drivers had opportunity to operate independent businesses is resolvable by common evidence (full‑time assignments, co‑loading/uniform rules) | Incorporation and business histories vary; Chambers factors require individualized inquiries to see if incorporation was a sham | Incorporation does not defeat class certification; opportunity‑to‑compete analysis and common policies predominate; individualized Chambers inquiries do not defeat certification |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 476 Mass. 95 (Mass. 2016) (Massachusetts independent‑contractor statute and factors for evaluating corporate‑form sham)
- Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 813 F.3d 429 (1st Cir. 2016) (Prong B of Massachusetts test preempted for motor carriers)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2011) (commonality requires issues capable of classwide resolution)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (U.S. 2013) (rigorous analysis required at class certification stage)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (U.S. 2016) (individual damages calculations do not necessarily defeat predominance)