Dashiell v. State
214 Md. App. 684
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2013Background
- July 2, 2011 cookout at the Carters’ home in Gaithersburg; appellant Brenden Dashiell arrived looking for his partner and remained after she left with their children.
- Multiple alcohol-consuming guests witnessed three separate physical confrontations between appellant and victim Justin Carter; the final encounter ended with Carter unconscious and later dying from head injuries.
- Appellant was indicted and tried for involuntary manslaughter (single count) based on an underlying unlawful act; the jury convicted and the court imposed a five-year flat sentence.
- At trial, the court instructed that self-defense was a defense to assault but not to affray; the prosecution relied in part on affray as the unlawful act supporting involuntary manslaughter.
- Appellant appealed raising three issues: (1) whether self-defense is a defense to affray; (2) sufficiency of evidence that the fight was in a public place / caused terror for affray; and (3) whether defense of property should have been instructed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether self-defense is a defense to affray | Self-defense generally exists but here appellant conceded mutual fighting and evidence showed mutuality, so instruction unnecessary | Self-defense applies to assaultive crimes and was generated by the evidence; jury should decide mutuality | Court held self-defense can be a defense to affray and the trial court erred by refusing to instruct on it when generated by the evidence; reversal and remand. |
| Whether affray could be an underlying unlawful act for involuntary manslaughter (public place / terror) | Affray was properly submitted because evidence showed the final fight occurred on the lawn near a public street and nearby homes; public-place element satisfied | Fight began on back porch/curtilage of private home so not in public and no evidence of terror to the people | Court held there was some evidence the final encounter occurred near a street and neighboring homes such that the public-place/terror element was properly for the jury; no error in allowing affray as a theory. |
| Whether defense of property should have been instructed for assault/affray | Not advanced by State | Appellant argued fighting resumed after Carter kicked his moped, so defense of property was generated | Court held defense-of-property instruction not generated: appellant testified he struck because Carter swung, and the intrusion (kicking the moped) had ended before the final fight. |
Key Cases Cited
- Briscoe v. State, 3 Md. App. 462 (1968) (riot precedent: violent acts need not actually terrorize specific persons; likelihood to alarm suffices)
- Schlamp v. State, 390 Md. 724 (2006) (riot/terror element requires evidence that conduct was likely to strike terror)
- Jones v. State, 357 Md. 408 (2000) (self-defense negates elements of other assaultive offenses; applicable to reckless endangerment)
- Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206 (1990) (defendant must produce some evidence of self-defense to generate instruction; any evidence, even if weak, suffices)
- Wilson v. State, 422 Md. 533 (2011) (reaffirming the "any evidence" standard for jury instructions on self-defense)
- Faulkner v. State, 301 Md. 482 (1984) (elements of perfect self-defense defined)
- Corbin v. State, 94 Md. App. 21 (1992) (separate confrontations can defeat characterization as a single continuing affray)
- Commonwealth v. Nee, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 441 (2013) (affray definition does not preclude self-defense instruction)
- Dawson v. State, 264 P.3d 851 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011) (if one participant unlawfully attacked, defender may not be guilty of affray)
- Coyle v. State, 72 S.W. 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903) (refusal to instruct self-defense on affray reversed where evidence conflicted on who provoked fight)