Darya I. Zappia v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 271 A.3d 753

Darya Zappia (owner) sought a permit to build a 30×36 noncommercial greenhouse, classified as an accessory structure, on her Rural District lot between the barn and the public road.
The Rural District space-and-bulk rules require a 50-foot front yard setback for “all structures”; Zappia’s plans placed the greenhouse entirely outside that 50-foot setback.
The Town CEO denied the permit under Old Orchard Beach Code § 78-1381(a): “No garage, swimming pool or other accessory building shall be located in a required front yard,” construing this to bar accessory buildings anywhere in a front yard.
Zappia appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals; after a de novo hearing the Board affirmed the CEO, interpreting “required front yard” to mean the entire front yard. The Superior Court affirmed the Board.
The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether “required front yard” in § 78-1381(a) prohibits accessory structures anywhere in the front yard or only within the district-defined front-yard setback.
The Court vacated and remanded: it held that “required front yard” cross-references the space-and-bulk (setback) requirements for the applicable zoning district, so an accessory greenhouse is allowed in the front yard if it lies outside the required setback (while recognizing an exception for districts—e.g., GB‑1—where the ordinance explicitly forbids accessory structures in the entire front yard).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of “required front yard” in § 78-1381(a)	“Required front yard” means the district-defined front-yard setback only; accessory structures may be in the front yard so long as they are outside the setback.	The phrase prohibits accessory buildings anywhere in a property’s front yard.	Court: “Required front yard” cross-references space-and-bulk rules; it means the portion required (i.e., the setback) except in districts where ordinance explicitly bans accessory structures in the entire front yard.
Operative decision / standard of review	Board conducted de novo review; its decision is operative for appellate review.	Town did not successfully show the Board’s review was limited to appellate review of CEO.	Court: Ordinance § 78-92 grants the Board de novo authority; the Board’s decision is the operative municipal decision for review.

LaPointe v. City of Saco, 419 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1980) (zoning terms construed by context; restrictions on property use strictly construed)
Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 868 A.2d 161 (Me. 2005) (when ordinance limits board review to appellate standards, CEO decision may be operative)
LaMarre v. Town of China, 259 A.3d 764 (Me. 2021) (distinguishing de novo board review from appellate review and its effect on operative decision)
Hill v. Town of Wells, 254 A.3d 1161 (Me. 2021) (reviewing municipal zoning board decisions and identifying operative municipal decision)
Jordan v. City of Ellsworth, 828 A.2d 768 (Me. 2003) (deference to municipal board on factual matters)
Isis Dev., LLC v. Town of Wells, 836 A.2d 1285 (Me. 2003) (interpretation of local ordinances is a question of law reviewed de novo)
Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Pros. Licensure, 896 A.2d 271 (Me. 2006) (avoid treating words or provisions as surplusage when construing ordinances)