Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, 450 F. App'x 480

Woods was convicted in Wayne County Circuit Court in 1990 of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, assault with intent to rob while armed, and felony firearm possession.
The trial was part of a joint proceeding with Mario Henderson, but juries were separate.
Kemp and Brewington were key prosecution witnesses; Woods claimed he was at Capers’ house only to buy marijuana and was not the shooter.
During post-conviction proceedings, Kemp recanted, claiming trial testimony was false; the trial court granted relief from judgment based on perceived perjury, which the Michigan Court of Appeals later reversed.
The Michigan appellate courts ultimately ruled Kemp’s recantation was not material or credible enough to warrant a new trial; Woods filed a federal habeas petition raising multiple claims.
The district court denied habeas relief; this court certified two issues on appeal and ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Woods denied due process by use of perjured testimony at trial?	Woods contends Kemp’s allegedly perjured testimony was material and the state knew or should have known of its falsity.	The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably found Kemp’s recantation not material and the prosecutor’s knowledge of falsity not shown beyond inconsistencies in testimony.	No; the state court’s materiality determination was not an unreasonable application of federal law.
Did Woods receive ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and present the Brewington issue?	Woods argues counsel failed to discover Brewington’s bond status and to cross-examine on potential bias, causing prejudice.	Woods failed to exhaust the claim properly; the remand and briefing did not fairly present the specific failure-to-investigate issue; the claim is procedurally defaulted.	No; the claim is procedurally defaulted and not excused, and merits review is therefore denied.
Were Woods’s ineffective-assistance claims exhausted and not procedurally defaulted?	Woods contends there was exhaustion through state litigation, including post-remand filings.	The state courts did not fairly present the failure-to-investigate claim; procedural rules barred review.	No; Woods did not exhaust properly, and the claims are procedurally defaulted.

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (deliberate deception by presenting known false evidence violates due process)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (false testimony material to guilt requires relief)
Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir. 1998) (three-part materiality test for perjury claims: material, false, prosecutor knew)
Bouquett, 837 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1988) (recanting testimony considered with respect to its potential effect on the jury)
United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1989) (mere inconsistencies do not prove knowing use of false testimony)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA deference standard for state-court adjudications)
Napue, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (see above)