Darryl Parker v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
482 S.W.3d 394
| Ky. | 2016Background
- Parker was convicted after jury trial of two first-degree robberies (Chase Bank Nov. 16, 2011; Jameson Inn Dec. 30, 2011), tampering with physical evidence, and being a felon in possession of a handgun; sentenced as a second-degree persistent felony offender to concurrent terms totaling 25 years.
- Physical evidence: a toboggan-style cap and sunglasses found near the bank; a loaded 9mm handgun found in a restroom trash can; clothing, masks, and a laptop recovered from a getaway car; DNA testing linked Parker as a likely contributor to several items (highly likely on the gun and certain sunglasses).
- Co-defendants/co‑witnesses Jodeci Chadwick and Rodericka Bryant testified that Parker planned and participated in the motel robbery; both made statements implicating Parker and later entered plea agreements with the Commonwealth.
- Parker testified he was innocent, claimed he was elsewhere to meet Chadwick and lend money, and presented his own DNA expert whose limited testing of two shirts produced inconclusive results.
- Procedural history: indictment Jan. 2012; initial trial mistried (March 2013); Parker sought last-minute continuance shortly before the retrial to allow expert review of Commonwealth DNA results—trial court denied; Parker did not object at trial to certain cross-examination questions or to alleged improper sentencing exhibits and later appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Parker's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of last‑minute continuance to allow DNA expert review violated due process | Parker argued the continuance was necessary to meaningfully challenge Commonwealth DNA evidence and prepare rebuttal expert analysis | Commonwealth argued Parker’s request was untimely, speculative, and caused by his own lack of diligence; trial court’s scheduling discretion should stand | Denial affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; request was belated, not prompted by late disclosure, and not shown to cause prejudice |
| Whether prosecutor’s cross‑examination asking if a witness was “mistaken” violated Moss and warrants reversal under palpable‑error rule | Parker argued the question improperly forced him to characterize a witness’s truthfulness (akin to Moss) and prejudiced his defense | Commonwealth argued the question merely allowed Parker to reiterate his defense (that co‑witnesses lied) and was not objected to at trial | No palpable error: even if improper, question did not produce manifest injustice because it echoed Parker’s defense and did not materially prejudice him |
| Whether introduction (or jury access) to certified prior‑conviction records containing improper details violated sentencing statutes and requires resentencing | Parker argued jury possibly saw unredacted certified records with dismissed/amended charges and victim IDs, exceeding what KRS allows and prejudicing the penalty phase | Commonwealth conceded potential admission but noted paralegal testimony and prosecutor’s argument remained within statutory limits; sentence supported by properly admitted priors and current offenses | No relief under palpable‑error: even assuming records reached jury, there was no reasonable possibility the improper details changed the sentence given multiple felony priors and gravity of current offenses |
| Whether any unpreserved trial errors amounted to manifest injustice under RCr 10.26 | Parker sought RCr 10.26 relief for continuance denial, Moss violation, and Robinson errors at sentencing | Commonwealth maintained errors were either not errors, harmless, or not prejudicial enough to meet palpable‑error standard | Court denied RCr 10.26 relief on all claims: no abuse of discretion and no manifest injustice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1964) (trial‑court continuance decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion and possible due‑process violation where denial deprives defendant of fair opportunity to prepare)
- Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (broad discretion for trial judges on scheduling; denial of continuance reversible only for unreasoning insistence on expeditiousness)
- Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1991) (continuance requests governed by case‑specific balancing factors under RCr 9.04)
- Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) (improper to badger witness into characterizing another witness as lying; such questioning may unfairly undermine witness credibility)
- Robinson v. Commonwealth, 926 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1996) (during sentencing jury may be shown prior convictions but only a general description of the prior crime; details and victim identities are excluded)
- Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340 (Ky. 2013) (presumed admission of unredacted certified prior‑conviction records does not warrant relief under palpable‑error rule absent reasonable possibility of prejudice)
- Newman v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 435 (Ky. 2012) (Moss violation may be harmless where prosecutor’s question merely verbalizes the defendant’s defense and does not produce palpable error)