Darryl P. Connelly v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17146
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Connelly, a white male, worked for the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) and was fired in 2009 shortly after Cheryl King, a Black woman, became his supervisor; he sued for racial discrimination and retaliation.
- Prior supervisors (three Black, one Hispanic) rated Connelly satisfactorily or better; after King became supervisor, complaints about Connelly’s timeliness, decisionmaking, and resistance to change increased.
- King repeatedly called herself a “mean black bitch” in Connelly’s presence on three occasions; Connelly kept a log of incidents and planned (but did not send) an internal discrimination complaint.
- After King confronted Connelly about complaints and he mentioned contacting the internal Equal Opportunity office, King and HR (Dawson) decided to terminate him; MARTA reported to the state that his services were no longer needed and not for cause.
- At trial on retaliation, the jury found MARTA liable and awarded $500,000, but found for King individually; the district court set aside the verdict as inconsistent and granted judgment as a matter of law for MARTA.
- The Eleventh Circuit vacated the judgment as a matter of law (reinstating the jury verdict against MARTA for retaliation), affirmed summary judgment dismissing Connelly’s racial-discrimination claim against King, and held Connelly waived his discovery complaint about privileged communications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly entered judgment as a matter of law based on inconsistent jury verdicts | Connelly: Rule 50 requires review of evidence sufficiency only; jury findings’ consistency is irrelevant | MARTA: judgment as a matter of law was appropriate because verdicts were inconsistent and remedy was justified | Court: Vacated JMOL; district court erred—Rule 50 review must focus solely on sufficiency of evidence, not verdict consistency; remand to reinstate jury verdict against MARTA for retaliation |
| Whether Connelly established a prima facie case of racial discrimination against King under McDonnell Douglas | Connelly: evidence and circumstantial “mosaic” create inference of discrimination | King: position not filled and no evidence of replacement by another race; circumstantial evidence insufficient | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for King—Connelly failed prima facie showing and his circumstantial evidence was weaker than in cases like Smith |
| Whether Rule 50(b) renewal may rely on jury verdict inconsistency grounds not raised earlier | Connelly: N/A (challenging district court’s reliance on inconsistency) | MARTA: argued inconsistency justified JMOL despite standards | Court: Rule 50(b) is renewal of sufficiency challenge only; jury verdict specifics are irrelevant to Rule 50 analysis; district court erred |
| Whether Connelly preserved claim that MARTA waived privilege regarding O’Neill’s communications | Connelly: disclosure of King’s email waived privilege and discovery into O’Neill was necessary | MARTA: maintained privilege; parties stipulated to limit questioning; no waiver | Court: Connelly waived the challenge by stipulating before trial not to elicit privileged testimony and by not questioning O’Neill at trial; appellate review denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012) (Rule 50 review focuses on evidence sufficiency; jury’s particular findings are irrelevant)
- Chaney v. City of Orlando, Fla., 483 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (Rule 50(b) is a renewal of the preverdict motion and verdict specifics are not germane)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (framework for prima facie disparate-treatment case)
- Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (circumstantial "mosaic" evidence can create a jury issue where motive and comparative discipline evidence are strong)
- Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1997) (elements required to establish prima facie racially discriminatory discharge)