Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr.
2017 Tenn. LEXIS 212
| Tenn. | 2017Background
- In 2009 Molly Bryant quitclaimed property to herself and her son Darryl Bryant, Sr. as joint tenants "for the purpose of creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship." Both deeds were recorded.
- In 2010 Molly executed a second quitclaim purporting to convey her interest in the same property to her grandson, Darryl F. Bryant, Jr.
- Molly died in 2013. Son sued grandson seeking declaratory judgment and possession, claiming survivorship made him sole owner; grandson argued Molly’s 2010 deed severed the joint tenancy and conveyed Molly’s one-half interest to him.
- Trial court granted summary judgment to Son (relying on Michigan authority treating express survivorship estates as non-severable); Court of Appeals affirmed on intent grounds. Tennessee Supreme Court granted review.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court held as a matter of law that a joint tenancy with an express right of survivorship may be unilaterally severed by one co-tenant’s conveyance to a third party, converting the estate into a tenancy in common and destroying the survivorship right; Molly’s 2010 deed severed the joint tenancy, so Son and Grandson hold as tenants in common.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bryant, Sr.) | Defendant's Argument (Bryant, Jr.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a joint tenancy with an express right of survivorship can be severed unilaterally by one co-tenant | The express survivorship language creates a protected expectancy that cannot be destroyed unilaterally; survivorship is akin to a contractual right | A co-tenant may convey her own interest to a third party, which severs the joint tenancy under common-law doctrine of severance | A joint tenancy with express survivorship is severable by unilateral conveyance; severance converts the estate to tenancy in common and destroys survivorship |
| Whether the 2010 quitclaim conveyed more than Molly owned or showed intent to limit the conveyance | Son asserted the 2010 deed conveyed only a contingent survivorship interest (i.e., nothing effective because Molly predeceased Son) | Grandson argued the 2010 deed conveyed Molly’s one-half interest and thus severed the tenancy | The Court interpreted the 2010 deed as conveying Molly’s interest (to the extent she owned it) and not limited by the derivation clause; severance occurred |
| Whether derivation/recital referencing the 2009 deed demonstrates intent to preserve survivorship | Son/Ct. of Appeals: reference shows Molly intended to limit the 2010 conveyance to lifetime interest/contingent remainder | Grandson: reference is a standard derivation clause for recording, not a limiting expression of intent | Reference in the 2010 deed was not treated as a limiting intent; it did not prevent severance |
| Standard of review and disposition | Summary judgment for Son should be upheld | Summary judgment was erroneous because factual issue not material to legal holding; severance is dispositive | Summary judgment for Son reversed; case remanded for further proceedings consistent with holding that severance occurred |
Key Cases Cited
- Peebles v. Peebles, 223 Tenn. 221, 443 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1969) (Tennessee recognizes survivorship only by express grant)
- McLeroy v. McLeroy, 163 Tenn. 124, 40 S.W.2d 1027 (Tenn. 1931) (one joint tenant can convey his interest without joinder of the other)
- Albro v. Allen, 434 Mich. 271, 454 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. 1990) (Michigan: joint tenancy with express survivorship treated as life estates with contingent remainders; not severable)
- Halleck v. Halleck, 216 Or. 23, 337 P.2d 330 (Or. 1959) (Oregon: express survivorship construed as life estates with contingent remainders; contingent remainders indestructible)
- United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (U.S. 2002) (general explanation that severance converts joint tenancy into tenancy in common)