Darrin Duane Ervin v. the State of Texas, 11-19-00228-CR

Appellant Darrin Duane Ervin was indicted for possession of methamphetamine (less than one gram) and convicted; sentenced to two years in state jail.
Officers executed a search warrant at a residence; Trooper Laurance Paul Adams arrested Ervin (and handcuffed him); Officer Ken Jones was also present.
Ervin was uncuffed twice (to give items to his wife and to relieve himself); later transported to jail where Trooper Adams recovered meth from Ervin’s pocket; lab testing confirmed methamphetamine.
In a recorded in‑car statement before jail booking, Ervin told Trooper Adams he had picked the meth up off the ground, knew the amount, and said he didn’t throw it away because he did not want his wife charged.
At trial Ervin testified Officer Jones had slipped the meth into his pocket; Officer Jones was not called as a witness; the jury rejected Ervin’s account and convicted.
On appeal Ervin argued (1) the trial court erred by omitting a voluntariness instruction from the charge, and (2) the evidence was legally insufficient to prove voluntary possession; the court affirmed.

Issue	Ervin’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Trial court omission of a voluntariness instruction in the application paragraph	Trial court should have instructed jury on voluntary possession because evidence raised a theory that Officer Jones planted the drug	Defense issue not requested or objected to; trial court need not sua sponte give unrequested defensive instruction; charge tracked statutory language	Affirmed — no error; Ervin procedurally defaulted and charge was legally adequate
Sufficiency of the evidence to prove voluntary possession	Evidence insufficient to prove Ervin voluntarily possessed the meth; acquittal required	Recorded admission and officer testimony show Ervin knowingly had and controlled the meth; credibility issues for jury to resolve	Affirmed — under Jackson review a rational juror could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes standard for sufficiency review)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (sufficiency review framework)
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (definition of hypothetically correct jury charge)
Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (procedural default for unrequested defensive charge)
Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (no sua sponte duty to instruct on unrequested defensive issues)
Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (two‑step charge‑error review)
Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (charge error standards)