Darren Bottinelli v. Josias Salazar
929 F.3d 1196
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- Petitioners are eight federal prisoners who sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to force immediate recalculation of "good time" credits under the First Step Act of 2018.
- Pre-First Step Act, BOP calculated statutory "up to 54 days" per year as 47 days (approved by Barber v. Thomas and prior decisions).
- First Step Act § 102(b)(1) amended 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) to permit up to 54 days/year and added § 3624(g) tied to a new "risk and needs assessment system" created by § 101(a).
- § 102(b)(2) (Effective Date) provides that the amendments "shall take effect beginning on the date that the Attorney General completes and releases the risk and needs assessment system," and § 101(a) required that system within 210 days of enactment (no later than July 19, 2019).
- Petitioners argued the 54-day amendment took effect on enactment (Dec. 21, 2018) and sought immediate recalculation; BOP and district court held the amendment was delayed until the assessment system was completed.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the statutory text unambiguously ties the § 3624(b) amendment’s effective date to establishment of the assessment system and rejecting statutory, drafting-error, and equal-protection challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did the First Step Act’s amendment to § 3624(b) (good-time credit) take effect? | Amendment effective on enactment (Dec. 21, 2018); immediate recalculation required. | Effective only when Attorney General completes/releases the risk-and-needs assessment system (per § 102(b)(2)), no earlier than July 19, 2019. | Held: Effective upon completion/release of the assessment system; not immediately upon enactment. |
| Whether "this subsection" in § 102(b)(2) applies to both amendments in § 102(b)(1) or only to § 3624(g) | "This subsection" should be read narrowly to apply only to § 3624(g), so good-time change is immediate. | "This subsection" refers to the amendments in the plural and thus applies to both § 3624(b) change and addition of § 3624(g). | Held: "This subsection" unambiguously covers both amendments; delay applies to the good-time change. |
| Whether the delay is a drafting error that courts should correct | Court should fix drafting oversight and give immediate effect to 54-day calculation. | No textual or contextual basis to presume a drafting error; courts should not rewrite clear statutory language. | Held: No basis to presume or correct a drafting error; court enforces enacted text. |
| Whether the delayed effective date violates Equal Protection (overserving some prisoners) | Delay irrationally deprives inmates with release dates between enactment and implementation of 54-day benefit. | Delay is rationally related to legitimate government interest in giving BOP time to implement administrative changes and manage releases. | Held: Rational-basis review satisfied; delay does not violate Equal Protection. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (discussing BOP’s historical 47-day calculation of § 3624(b))
- Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395 (general rule that statutes take effect at enactment absent clear direction otherwise)
- Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (courts should not rescue Congress from drafting errors)
- Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (distinguishing filling silence from rewriting explicit provisions)
- McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (deference to legislative classifications under rational-basis review)
- United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104 (rejecting similar equal-protection challenge to delayed implementation and recognizing legitimate administrative interests)
- Padilla-Diaz v. United States, 862 F.3d 856 (rational-basis standard and recognition that statutes may produce unequal results yet survive review)
- ABKCO Music, Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684 (distinguishing clarifying vs. substantive amendments)
- Beaver v. Tarsadia Hotels, 816 F.3d 1170 (amendment that changes substance cannot be treated as clarifying for retroactivity purposes)
