Darrell Haze v. Mark Kubicek
880 F.3d 946
7th Cir.2018Background
- On March 22, 2012, Milwaukee police on bicycle patrol approached Darrell Haze and another man near the Bradley Center amid concerns about illegal ticket scalping; Haze held a sign reading “We need tickets.”
- Officers asked questions; accounts diverged: Kubicek says Haze acted evasively, walked off, ignored an order to stop, and resisted when detained; Haze says he complied and was grabbed and slammed to the ground without cause.
- Haze was ticketed for disorderly conduct; he prevailed on that ticket in municipal court and then sued Officer Kubicek under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unlawful stop, false arrest, excessive force, and racial discrimination.
- After a bench denial of summary-judgment motions, a jury at trial found Kubicek not liable for false arrest, excessive force, or intentional discrimination, but found the initial stop lacked reasonable suspicion and thus was unlawful; the jury concluded the unlawful stop did not proximately cause compensable injury.
- Posttrial, Haze sought JNOV or a new trial (arguing the verdict was inconsistent) and requested nominal damages and a declaratory judgment; the district court awarded $1 nominal damages but denied other relief. Haze appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of Haze’s summary-judgment motion on false arrest is reviewable | Haze contends he was entitled to summary judgment on false arrest | Kubicek contends the denial was interlocutory and the jury resolved the claim at trial | Denial is procedurally unreviewable on appeal because Haze failed to preserve the issue by moving under Rule 50(b) after trial (appeal barred) |
| Whether the jury returned an inconsistent verdict (unlawful stop but no excessive force) | Haze argues an unlawful stop necessarily renders any subsequent force excessive | Kubicek argues lawfulness of a stop and reasonableness of force are distinct inquiries | Verdict is not inconsistent; unlawful stop and excessive-force claims are separate under Fourth Amendment analysis |
| Whether the court should have entered a declaratory judgment that the stop was unlawful | Haze seeks a formal declaration to give effect to the jury’s finding | Kubicek argues declaratory relief is discretionary and unnecessary because the verdict and nominal damages suffice | Denial of declaratory relief affirmed as reasonable exercise of discretion; jury verdict and $1 nominal damages are adequate vindication |
| Whether an officer may lawfully approach and ask questions without suspicion and when an encounter ripens into a detention | (Implicit) Haze treats approach and detention as one inquiry | Kubicek notes police may approach without suspicion but need reasonable suspicion to detain | Court clarifies: approach/questioning requires no suspicion; investigative detention requires reasonable suspicion; here the stop lacked reasonable suspicion but that did not automatically make force excessive |
Key Cases Cited
- Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (procedural rule that failure to move under Rule 50(b) preserves sufficiency-of-evidence review)
- Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (same principle about Rule 50(b) and posttrial motion preservation)
- County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (excessive-force claims are conceptually distinct from other Fourth Amendment claims)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (excessive-force claims judged under objective-reasonableness/Graham factors)
- MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (Declaratory Judgment Act confers discretion to grant declaratory relief)
- Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (further explaining district-court discretion under Declaratory Judgment Act)