Darrel Wayne Brown v. the State of Texas
01-19-00440-CR
| Tex. App. | Jun 17, 2021Background
- Darrel Wayne Brown was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed.
- The complainant (born Nov. 2011) testified Brown sexually abused her repeatedly during a winter period when she was about nine (first incident during Christmas break); she described multiple penetrative acts over a period she estimated as "maybe three months" and confirmed the abuse occurred over more than 30 days.
- The complainant disclosed the abuse in counseling; the counselor's contemporaneous records and testimony were admitted.
- An extraneous victim, C.D., testified Brown sexually abused her as a child in a substantially similar manner; Brown had two 1985 convictions for indecency with a child.
- Brown challenged (1) legal sufficiency, arguing the acts fell outside the dates alleged and/or occurred within less than 30 days; and (2) the court's admission of C.D.’s testimony as improper extraneous-offense evidence and unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for continuous sexual abuse (30+ day period) | State: Victim's testimony, counselor records, and reasonable inferences show multiple acts over >30 days; “on or about” pleading allows date flexibility | Brown: Testimony places incidents within a shorter winter break and outside indictment dates so no continuous offense as charged | Affirmed — evidence sufficient; jurors may infer >30-day period; “on or about” dates need only be before presentment and within limitations (none here) |
| Admission of extraneous-offense evidence (C.D.) under Art. 38.37 and Rule 403 | State: Art. 38.37 permits prior child-sexual-offense evidence; C.D.’s testimony is highly probative (substantially similar conduct) and not unduly prejudicial; limiting instruction given | Brown: C.D.’s incidents are remote (30+ years) and prejudicial, adding no probative value | Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion; Art. 38.37 made evidence admissible and the Rule 403 balancing favored admission (probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for appellate legal-sufficiency review)
- Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (framework for sufficiency review and appellate role)
- Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (circumstantial evidence probative as direct evidence)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (sufficiency review endorsing reasonable-inference analysis)
- Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (standards for evaluating sufficiency with circumstantial evidence)
- Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ("on or about" date in indictment allows proof of alternate dates before presentment)
- De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (test for admissibility of extraneous-offense evidence and 403 balancing)
- Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factors for Rule 403 balancing)
- Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (abuse-of-discretion review for evidentiary rulings)
- Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (presumption that juries follow limiting instructions)