170 A.3d 182
D.C.2017Background
- Early-morning home-invasion robbery: masked men forced entry, stole vehicles and valuables; two stolen cars and other property later taken to an unoccupied house at 308 Raleigh St. SE.
- Mason was arrested at that house after police knocked and the group scattered/hid stolen items; police recovered masks and much stolen property but not the gun.
- Several accomplices drove the stolen cars to a field and set them on fire to destroy evidence.
- During voir dire, Juror 7575-B said her half-brother had been treated unfairly by the justice system as a black man and that black men in D.C. are treated unfairly; she also said she thought she could be impartial.
- The prosecutor moved to strike Juror 7575-B for cause; the trial court granted the motion solely because she expressed a belief in systemic racial unfairness in the criminal-justice system.
- Mason was convicted of multiple offenses (including tampering for burning the cars); the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on jury-selection error and remanded, but held the evidence sufficient to retry tampering counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred in striking Juror 7575-B for cause based on her view that the criminal-justice system treats black men unfairly | Mason: Removal was improper because juror said she could be impartial and belief in systemic unfairness is common and not disqualifying | United States: Juror‟s statements showed she believed systemic unfairness exists in D.C., supporting for-cause removal | Court: Error to remove juror for cause absent an individualized finding that her belief would prevent impartiality; reversal required |
| Whether defendant must show prejudice (an actually biased juror seated) to obtain reversal after erroneous juror removal | Mason: He should not be required to show actual prejudice because exclusion skewed the jury and disproportionately affects black venirepersons | United States: Mason bore burden to prove prejudice from the erroneous removal | Court: Mason need not prove prejudice; because the exclusion risked skewing the jury and had disparate impact, reversal warranted and government did not show harmlessness |
| Whether an MPD investigation qualifies as an "official proceeding" under the tampering statute | Mason: Police investigation is not an official proceeding; conviction requires a more formal proceeding | United States: MPD investigation is included within the statute's definition of "official proceeding" | Court: MPD investigations fall within § 22-721(4) plain language; so an investigation can be an official proceeding for tampering |
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support tampering convictions (knowledge that an official proceeding had begun or was likely) | Mason: No proof he knew an official proceeding was likely or that investigation targeted him | United States: Nature and seriousness of the home-invasion made it reasonable to infer Mason knew police investigation was likely; burning cars showed intent to impair evidence | Court: Evidence sufficient; reasonable juror could infer Mason knew an investigation had or would likely be instituted and intended to impair evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Barrows v. United States, 15 A.3d 673 (D.C. 2011) (trial court has broad discretion to strike juror for cause)
- Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47 (D.C. 2000) (inferable bias requires record support that juror cannot decide objectively)
- Wynn v. United States, 48 A.3d 181 (D.C. 2012) (statutory interpretation of "official proceeding" in obstruction context)
- Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663 (D.C. 2009) (erroneous juror excusal ordinarily does not seat a biased juror; exceptions exist where exclusion skews jury)
- Padilla-Mendoza v. United States, 157 F.3d 730 (9th Cir. 1998) (court must determine whether juror's beliefs would impair performance; cannot dismiss for cause based solely on disagreement with law)
- King v. State, 414 A.2d 909 (Md. 1980) (error disqualifying jurors based on general policy disagreement)
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1968) (exclusion of jurors for general objections to death penalty invalidates sentence)
- Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (U.S. 1988) (capital-jury selection jurisprudence informing standard for prejudicial juror exclusion)
- Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (U.S. 1976) (erroneous exclusion of a potential juror in capital case requires reversal)
- Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (U.S. 1986) (limits on capital-case exclusion doctrine outside death-penalty context)
- Offutt v. United States, 157 A.3d 191 (D.C. 2017) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)