79 F.4th 352
4th Cir.2023Background
- The U.S.–Lithuania Extradition Treaty (Art. 8 §3(b)) requires a Requesting State to transmit “a copy of the charging document” when seeking extradition of a person "sought for prosecution."
- Darius Vitkus, a Lithuanian national, was subject to three Lithuanian investigations (2008, 2009, 2011); Lithuanian authorities issued Notifications of Suspicion, Suspect Decisions, and arrest orders, but no indictment or formal charging instrument initiating prosecution. Vitkus left Lithuania in 2010 and obtained withholding of removal based on torture findings from the BIA.
- Lithuania submitted an extradition request (2015) with Notifications of Suspicion, Suspect Decisions, investigative summaries, and arrest orders but no indictment. The Secretary of State sought extradition; a Florida magistrate certified extraditability in 2021, finding those documents sufficient.
- Vitkus filed § 2241 habeas petitions and sought injunctive relief in federal court to block extradition, arguing the Treaty requires production of the discrete charging instrument (comparable to an indictment) and that extradition would violate immigration/CAT protections. The Virginia district court denied a preliminary injunction, deferring to the Secretary’s broader treaty interpretation.
- The Fourth Circuit (majority) reversed: it held the Treaty’s phrase “the charging document” unambiguously requires a discrete instrument that initiates charges (indictment-like), concluded Notifications/Suspect Decisions do not suffice, and granted relief pending further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Charging-document requirement under Art. 8 §3(b) | "The charging document" plainly means the discrete instrument that initiates criminal charges (indictment or equivalent); Lithuania produced none. | The Treaty does not demand any particular form; Notifications of Suspicion and Suspect Decisions sufficiently identify charges and facts; deference owed to Executive. | Court: Treaty language is plain and unambiguous; it requires a discrete charging document initiating charges; Notifications/Suspect Decisions do not satisfy it; plaintiff likely to succeed. |
| Deference to Executive Branch treaty interpretation | No deference when treaty text is plain and cannot bear the government's construction. | If text ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is entitled to deference. | Court: Text is unambiguous; therefore no deference to Secretary; district court erred to adopt Secretary’s construction. |
| Preliminary injunction — irreparable harm (Winter factor) | Extradition would be irreversible and moot habeas relief, so irreparable harm exists. | Government emphasized public interest in extradition and foreign-relations considerations. | Court: Extradition would moot the petition and cause irreparable harm; Winter factor satisfied. |
| Equities and public interest | Public interest favors lawful compliance with treaty requirements; denying extradition that violates the Treaty supports rule of law. | Public interest favors executing valid extradition requests and international comity. | Court: Balance and public interest weigh for plaintiff because enforcing treaty text matters; injunction appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for preliminary injunctions)
- Niz‑Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) (definite article + singular noun indicates a discrete document)
- Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982) (Executive Branch treaty interpretation entitled to weight when text ambiguous)
- Aguasvivas v. Pompeo, 984 F.3d 1047 (1st Cir. 2021) (treaty language requiring a document setting forth charges is substantive and constraining)
- Sacirbey v. Guccione, 589 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2009) (extradition requires production of the proof the treaty prescribes; producing a substitute document can be insufficient)
- Manrique v. Kolc, 65 F.4th 1037 (9th Cir. 2023) (contrasting Ninth Circuit decision upholding broader reading of an identical charging-document clause)