455 S.W.3d 711
Tex. App.2014Background
- In May 2010 a Montgomery County court civilly committed Darius Briggs as a sexually violent predator under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 841.081 and imposed requirements under § 841.082.
- Briggs attended a required treatment program in El Paso County and was discharged in 2011 for noncompliance with program requirements.
- A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Briggs under § 841.085 for violating his civil-commitment requirements; the indictment alleged the offense occurred in Montgomery County.
- At trial the State presented proof that Briggs violated the commitment requirements in El Paso County, not Montgomery County.
- Briggs moved for a directed verdict arguing a material variance between the indictment (venue in Montgomery County) and the proof (El Paso). The trial court denied the motion; the jury convicted and assessed life confinement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a material variance exists between indictment venue and proof at trial | Briggs: indictment alleged Montgomery County but proof showed El Paso County, creating a fatal variance and undermining conviction | State: statute authorizes prosecution in Montgomery County for § 841.085 offenses regardless of where elements occurred, so no variance | No material variance; indictment alleging county of prosecution is permissible under statutory venue rules |
| Whether evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction | Briggs: proof did not show offense occurred in Montgomery County, so evidence insufficient | State: venue statute makes Montgomery County a proper forum; proof of violation (wherever it occurred) suffices | Evidence legally sufficient to support conviction under § 841.085 when prosecuted in Montgomery County |
Key Cases Cited
- Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (test for material variance between indictment and proof)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for legal sufficiency review)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (legal/factual sufficiency standard articulation)
- Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (venue is not an element to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Compton v. State, 289 S.W. 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (indictment may allege county of prosecution where statute authorizes it)
- U.S. v. Sprick, 233 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 2000) (variance review factors cited in Gollihar)