Darious Mays v. Ken Clark
807 F.3d 968
9th Cir.2015Background
- At 17, Darious Mays was arrested for a drive‑through murder after surveillance showed two men (one in a gray sweatshirt) near the scene; witnesses later associated the gray‑clad figure with the shooter.
- During a custodial, videotaped interrogation Detective Husted read Miranda rights; Mays twice referenced having a lawyer and asked that his lawyer be called.
- Despite Mays’s request, officers continued questioning, brought in his girlfriend, denied a polygraph examiner was available, then conducted a sham "mock" polygraph, showed fabricated failing results, and obtained inculpatory statements that Mays was the person in the gray sweatshirt and present at the shooting.
- The trial court admitted those statements; Mays was convicted of first‑degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life without parole plus a firearm enhancement.
- The California Court of Appeal held Mays’s request for counsel was equivocal and any Miranda error was harmless; the California Supreme Court denied review.
- The federal district court found the state court unreasonably applied Miranda but held the error harmless; the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief under AEDPA, agreeing the Miranda ruling was unreasonable but the harmless‑error finding was not.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mays) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mays invoked the right to counsel unambiguously | Mays argues his statements (“my step‑dad got a lawyer…can you call him…have my lawyer come down here”) were a clear request for counsel that required cessation of questioning | State argues the request was equivocal and, in context, ambiguous such that police need not have stopped | Court: Mays’s request was unambiguous; state court unreasonably applied Davis — Miranda invocation required cessation |
| Whether post‑invocation statements could be used to undermine clarity of the request | Mays contends subsequent denials don’t negate his earlier unambiguous request | State relies on post‑request denials to argue ambiguity and to justify continued questioning | Court: Post‑invocation denials cannot be used to cast doubt on the earlier request (Smith v. Illinois) |
| Whether the sham polygraph and ensuing statements were admissible | Mays argues statements were obtained in violation of Miranda and should have been excluded | State argues even if Miranda violated, admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and statements would be admissible for impeachment | Court: Miranda violation occurred, but under AEDPA and Brecht the state court’s harmlessness determination was not objectively unreasonable — habeas denied |
| Whether Mays suffered "actual prejudice" warranting habeas relief | Mays argues the improper admission induced his trial testimony and prejudiced the trial | State argues independent evidence (a neighbor’s identification and other evidence) made the admission harmless | Held: No actual prejudice shown; Schallenberg’s prior identification and other evidence supported harmlessness under AEDPA/Brecht |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial suspects must be informed of rights and interrogation must cease after request for counsel)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (police must stop questioning after a request for counsel unless counsel is made available or defendant initiates further communication)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (invocation of right to counsel must be unambiguous to require cessation)
- Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (postrequest responses cannot be used to cast doubt on clarity of an earlier invocation)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (harmless‑error framework for constitutional errors on direct review)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (habeas relief requires showing of "actual prejudice" under a substantial and injurious effect standard)
- Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (clarifies that Brecht governs federal habeas harmlessness review and discusses interaction with Chapman/AEDPA)
- Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (if a defendant’s trial testimony was induced by an improperly admitted confession, that testimony cannot bolster the prosecution’s case absent proof confession did not induce testimony)