Danny Jones v. Thomas Vilsack
20-5821
| 6th Cir. | Jun 29, 2021Background
- Danny Jones, an African American Soil Conservationist with the USDA NRCS, faced a 2005 allegation by co-worker Lori Pittman that he exposed himself; an internal investigation was inconclusive.
- Jones sued Pittman for slander and filed EEO complaints; Pittman later filed an EEO complaint requesting not to work with Jones.
- The Agency temporarily reassigned Jones to Nashville during a second investigation, later permanently reassigned him to Nashville, and later reassigned his position within Nashville.
- Jones sought reasonable accommodations (work from home, windowed workspace, noise‑cancelling headphones); some requests were delayed, partially denied, then later one was approved after additional documentation.
- Administrative EEO processes dismissed Jones’s complaints; he sued under Title VII (retaliation, race discrimination) and the Rehabilitation Act (failure to accommodate).
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Agency; Jones appealed four retaliation claims and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Second investigation and temporary reassignment to Nashville | Jones: Agency encouraged Pittman to file a new EEO complaint to retaliate for his prior EEO suit and federal lawsuit. | Agency: Pittman independently filed an EEO complaint alleging harassment, which legitimately prompted investigation and temporary relocation. | Held: No causation — Pittman’s complaint was an intervening, legitimate reason; Jones failed to show but‑for causation. |
| 2) Delay in acting on reasonable accommodation request | Jones: Delay (and partial denials) were retaliatory for his prior EEO filings. | Agency: Request was verbal and misunderstood, supervisor unaware; Agency promptly investigated once informed and required additional medical documentation; delay not causally linked. | Held: Forfeited some theories; in any event no temporal proximity or other evidence of causation — no prima facie retaliation. |
| 3) Permanent reassignment to Nashville | Jones: Permanent move was retaliation for earlier EEO activity. | Agency: Significant time elapsed between protected activity and reassignment; contemporaneous recommendation to separate Jones and Pittman provided a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason. | Held: No causation — long time gap and intervening legitimate reason defeated claim. |
| 4) Later lateral reassignment within Nashville (different Soil Conservationist duties) — pretext | Jones: Reassignment was culmination of a multi‑year scheme to take his job; Agency’s stated reasons were pretextual. | Agency: Reorganization created a vacancy; Jones had requisite experience and was reassigned to fill the need; practice of similar reassignments shown. | Held: Agency offered legitimate nonretaliatory reasons; Jones failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that those reasons were pretextual. |
Key Cases Cited
- Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2003) (elements of Title VII retaliation prima facie case)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for employment discrimination claims)
- Univ. of Texas S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2013) (retaliation requires but‑for causation)
- Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2020) (temporal proximity and intervening causes in causation analysis)
- Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2013) (intervening events can defeat causation)
- Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012) (decision to leave work site as intervening event)
- Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (temporal proximity as a factor in causation)
- Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1986) (multi‑month delay insufficient, alone, to show causation)
- Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019) (plaintiff’s burden to show employer’s reasons were pretext for retaliation)
- Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2012) (pretext requires showing proffered reasons were untrue or insufficient)
