Dannie Carl Pattison v. State of Indiana
54 N.E.3d 361
| Ind. | 2016Background
- Pattison was stopped for inoperable taillights; officers observed signs of intoxication and a portable breath test indicated alcohol. He later submitted to a certified breath test ~1.5 hours after the stop showing an ACE of 0.10. He was charged with operating a vehicle with ACE ≥ 0.08.
- Trial evidence: certified chemical test results and officer observations; Pattison defended by claiming medical conditions and possible inhaler interference and denied drinking that night.
- Jury was instructed with a statutory-based instruction that mirrored Ind. Code § 9-30-6-15(b): if a chemical test within three hours shows ACE ≥ 0.08, "the jury shall presume" ACE ≥ 0.08 at time of driving, but "the presumption is rebuttable." No contemporaneous objection was made at trial.
- Pattison appealed, arguing the instruction created a mandatory presumption that shifted the burden of proof and thus violated due process; the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the instruction misleading. The State sought transfer.
- The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed whether the instruction constituted fundamental error (given no trial objection) and whether it unconstitutionally relieved the State of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Pattison) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction ("shall presume...; however, the presumption is rebuttable") created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that shifted the State's burden to disprove the element of ACE at time of driving | The instruction correctly tracks the statute, creates a rebuttable presumption, does not relieve the State of proving ACE, and is constitutionally permissible under precedent | The phrasing "shall presume" could mislead jurors into believing the presumption is mandatory and shift the burden to defendant to disprove ACE at the time of driving | The instruction did not unconstitutionally shift the burden. It describes a mandatory rebuttable presumption that is permissible because the State still must prove the predicate (certified test within three hours) and the defendant may rebut; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (Due Process forbids presumptions that shift burden of proof on an essential element)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (distinguishes mandatory presumptions from permissive inferences; mandatory presumptions infirm if they shift burden)
- Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1992) (approves statutory instruction mirroring § 9-30-6-15 as constitutionally permissible)
- Chilcutt v. State, 544 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (upheld predecessor statute’s rebuttable presumption; defendant bears burden of production to rebut)
- Smith v. State, 502 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (held that without extrapolation evidence the State failed to prove ACE at time of offense, prompting the legislature’s statutory presumption)
