Daniels v. Mueller
1:23-cv-05654
S.D.N.Y.Mar 28, 2025Background
- DOCCS implemented the Medications With Abuse Potential (MWAP) policy in June 2017, requiring Regional Medical Director (RMD) approval before certain drugs (e.g., gabapentin, pregabalin, tramadol, oxycodone) could be prescribed long term; the policy was rescinded in 2021.
- A class action (Allen I) challenged MWAP; the district court converted a preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction finding Eighth Amendment violations, a decision later affirmed by the Second Circuit.
- After the court denied certification of a damages liability class, ten former class members filed individual § 1983 damages suits against DOCCS clinicians and RMDs alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference based on MWAP-driven denials or discontinuations.
- The RMDs (notably Dr. Susan Mueller, Dr. David Dinello, and Dr. John Hammer) reviewed MWAP requests from facility providers; plaintiffs allege RMDs often reflexively applied MWAP rather than exercising individualized medical judgment.
- The Court adjudicated eleven summary-judgment motions across the ten cases, resolving issues of deliberate indifference, personal involvement, qualified immunity, and PLRA exhaustion as to specific defendants and plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deliberate indifference from MWAP denials | RMDs reflexively applied MWAP despite treating-physician recommendations, expert opinions, and prior effective treatment | Denials reflected medical judgment favoring safer alternatives and lacked diagnostic support | Summary judgment denied as to many RMDs where material fact disputes exist; some defendants granted (e.g., Daniels claim vs. Mueller dismissed for lack of evidence of personal involvement) |
| Personal involvement under § 1983 | Liability rests on each defendant’s own decisions (including RMD denials) | Defendants stress absence of direct participation or individualized review | Court applied Tangreti/Iqbal; dismissed claims where no evidence of personal involvement (e.g., Mueller re: Daniels) |
| Qualified immunity for RMDs and treating clinicians | Plaintiffs: clearly established right not to have officials reflexively apply policy over treating physicians’ recommendations | Defendants: right should be defined narrowly by particular treatment decision; objectively reasonable choices | Court held the Second Circuit’s Johnson/Brock line clearly established the right against reflexive policy application; qualified immunity denied where factual disputes exist (also denied for Dr. Lee based on Chance standard) |
| Exhaustion (PLRA) | Administrative remedies were unavailable or operated as a dead end under MWAP; prior grievances put DOCCS on notice of continuing denials | Defendants argue plaintiffs failed to exhaust specific MWAP denials | Court found administrative remedies unavailable in context and prior grievances sufficient for continuing claims; exhaustion-based dismissals denied for Dockery, Gradia, Pritchett |
| Treating-physician liability (e.g., Dr. Lee) | Some treating providers consciously chose less effective, easier regimens despite ongoing severe pain | Defendants: providers exercised reasonable professional judgment | Summary judgment denied where record supports a jury could find the clinician chose an easier/less efficacious plan (Chance) |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment prohibits deliberate indifference to serious medical needs)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective deliberate-indifference standard requires actual or obvious risk awareness)
- Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (two-part deliberate-indifference inquiry: objective seriousness and subjective culpability)
- Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698 (2d Cir. 1998) (deliberate indifference can arise when a physician consciously chooses an easier, less efficacious treatment)
- Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 2005) (officials may be liable where they reflexively apply a policy despite treating-physician recommendations)
- Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003) (examines whether following a policy can amount to deliberate indifference)
- Griffin v. Amatucci, [citation="611 F. App'x 732"] (2d Cir. 2015) (right not to have a policy reflexively applied despite a treating physician’s contrary recommendation)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (PLRA exhaustion excused where administrative remedies are unavailable, opaque, or a dead end)
- Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020) (§ 1983 liability requires each defendant’s personal conduct causing the violation)
- Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017) (qualified immunity inquiry turns on whether law was clearly established to a reasonable official)