Danielle Quemada v. Arizmendez & Acosta
288 P.3d 826
Idaho2012Background
- Married in 1985, Decedent and Celia Ortega began living apart in 1999 and were not divorced until 2009; four parcels of real property were acquired during the marriage.
- On December 30, 2008, Decedent and Celia executed four quitclaim deeds conveying the Hill Road, El Paso Drive, and two rental properties to Acosta; deeds were promptly recorded.
- February 24, 2009: Hill Road property conveyed from Acosta to Arizmendez; El Paso Drive property later conveyed back to Celia Ortega.
- Decedent died November 13, 2009; he had three children: Richard Ortega Jr., Denise Mota, and Danielle Quemada; Elizabeth Ortega is their mother.
- January 12, 2012: Arizmendez petitions to adjudicate intestacy and be appointed administrator; Quemada petitions to be personal representative and filed TEDRA petition to set aside two deeds.
- District court granted summary judgment for Arizmendez/Acosta; Quemada appealed asserting undue influence and fraud; issues narrowed, and district court decision affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presumption of undue influence | Quemada asserts confidential relationship with Celia supports presumption. | No confidential relationship between Decedent and Acosta; presumption not applicable. | No presumption of undue influence based on relationship; not applied. |
| Undue influence merits for Hill Road deed | Undue influence shown by decedent’s vulnerability and influence by Celia. | No evidence decedent was subject to influence; uncontroverted facts negate claim. | Summary judgment proper; decedent not subject to undue influence. |
| Fraud viability of quitclaim | Celia’s misrepresentation caused transfer; fraud elements met. | No misrepresentation by respondents; nine elements of fraud not satisfied. | Summary judgment proper; fraud claim fails on all elements. |
| Use of Vreeken standard of review | District court erred by not considering all evidence; should scour record. | Vreeken allows not scanning the entire record; burden on opposing party to present evidence. | Court properly applied Vreeken standard; no error in standard of review. |
| Decedent's intent and disputed facts | Intent regarding Hill Road disposition is disputed and should be construed for Quemada. | District court disposed of claims on uncontroverted facts; intent irrelevant to ruling. | No error; trial court relied on uncontroverted facts to grant summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng’g, B.V., 148 Idaho 89 (2009) (trial court not required to scour record for issues of material fact; opposing party must present evidence)
- Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1 (1979) (undue-influence elements; subject to influence depends on grantor's state of mind)
- McNabb v. Brewster, 272 P.2d 289 (1954) (presumption of undue influence where confidential relationship and frailty evident)
- Bongiovi v. Jameson, 718 P.2d 1172 (1986) (limits on presumption of undue influence; confers burden-shifting only with confidential relation)
- Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 150 P.3d 288 (2006) (fraud elements; heightened pleading under I.R.C.P. 9(b) but standard defenses apply to summary judgment)
- Kelley v. Wheyland, 471 P.2d 590 (1970) (limits on undue-influence presumptions in later cases)
- Keenan v. Brooks, 606 P.2d 473 (1980) (undue-influence inquiry; confirms limits on when influence is presumed)
- Keebler v. Esser Electric, not provided in opinion (not provided in opinion) (quoted for principle that trial court need not search record when evaluating summary judgment)