Danielle Estrada v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
678 F. App'x 494
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (Kaiser employees) filed a California class action alleging violations of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 222 and 226 and a derivative UCL claim based on a $.09/hour contribution to an LMP/Partnership Trust.
- Plaintiffs contend the $.09 contribution is an unlawful deduction from the "wage agreed upon" and was not itemized on wage statements.
- The challenged terms appear in National Agreements (containing an LMP Trust Provision and across-the-board percentage wage increases) and in Local Agreements (which contain Negotiated Wage Rates tables).
- Kaiser removed to federal court; plaintiffs moved to remand to state court arguing their claims arise under state law independent of the CBA.
- The district court found Section 301 of the LMRA preempted the state-law claims; the Ninth Circuit reviews that determination de novo and affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §301 preempts §222 claim | The agreed wage is fixed by the National Agreement; the $.09 is an unlawful withholding under §222 | The agreed wage is set by Local Agreement Negotiated Wage Rates; the $.09 is a factor in calculating wages, not a withholding | Preempted — resolving requires interpreting how National and Local Agreements interact (CBA interpretation) |
| Whether §301 preempts §226 claim | The $.09 was a deduction not separately listed on wage statements | The $.09 is not a deduction but part of the wage-calculation framework under the CBA | Preempted — determining deduction vs. wage factor requires CBA interpretation |
| Whether derivative UCL claim survives if §222/§226 are preempted | UCL claim stands on state-law harms | Kaiser: UCL claim depends on §222/§226 violations | Dismissed as derivative — UCL claim fails because underlying Labor Code claims are preempted |
| Standard for §301 preemption | N/A (procedural) | N/A | Court applies test whether claim requires interpreting CBA (preempted) or merely looking to it (not preempted); here interpretation is required, so preemption applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus. v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 288 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review for remand denial)
- Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Section 301 preemption principles)
- Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (distinguishing reference-to-CBA versus interpretation-of-CBA)
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (test whether resolution requires interpreting the CBA)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (preemption framework for state-law claims dependent on CBAs)
- Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2015) (UCL claims derivative of Labor Code violations)
AFFIRMED.