Daniel VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.
951 F.3d 397
6th Cir.2020Background
- Plaintiffs are Michigan consumers who defaulted on credit accounts; defendants LVNV and Midland bought the debts and retained law firms (Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C. and Berndt & Associates) to pursue collection.
- State-court collection actions produced judgments against each debtor (defaults or consents); defendants then filed writs of garnishment to collect post-judgment amounts.
- Plaintiffs did not object to the garnishment writs within Michigan’s 14-day window. The writs, however, calculated post-judgment interest at 13%. Michigan law generally prescribes the rate under MCL § 600.6013(8); 13% applies only to judgments based on written instruments under § 600.6013(7). Most underlying judgments here were not based on written instruments.
- Plaintiffs sued in federal court under the FDCPA and Michigan consumer statutes, alleging defendants falsely represented amounts owed and attempted to collect impermissible interest.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Rooker–Feldman did not bar the suit and remanded for consideration of other defenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker–Feldman bars the federal FDCPA suit | VanderKodde: federal claim challenges defendants’ conduct in calculating garnishment amounts, not the state judgments | Defendants: plaintiffs are state-court losers seeking federal review of state-court collection orders | Rooker–Feldman does not apply; case remanded (no subject-matter-jurisdiction bar) |
| Characterization of writs of garnishment | Plaintiffs: injury arises from defendants’ filings that inflated amounts | Defendants: writs are state-court orders equivalent to judgments | Court: writs are ministerial and not state-court judgments for Rooker–Feldman purposes |
| Source of plaintiffs’ injury | Plaintiffs: injury stems from defendants’ tallying and collection attempts in the garnishment requests | Defendants: injury stems from underlying judgments that specified interest | Court: injury stems from defendants’ independent post-judgment calculations, not the judgments themselves |
| Whether other defenses can dispose of the case (standing, comity, statute of limitations) | Plaintiffs: federal court should reach merits | Defendants: various non-jurisdictional defenses may bar relief | Court: left to district court to resolve on remand (did not decide these issues) |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker–Feldman applies only to state-court losers seeking review of state judgments)
- Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889 (6th Cir. 2020) (Michigan garnishment writs are ministerial and Rooker–Feldman did not bar FDCPA claim)
- Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2006) (FDCPA claim alleging false affidavit to obtain garnishment not barred by Rooker–Feldman)
- Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rooker–Feldman applied where plaintiff had litigated and lost same objections in state court)
- Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2012) (source-of-injury test for Rooker–Feldman)
- Matich v. Modern Research Corp., 420 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 1988) (distinction between pre-judgment interest vesting at judgment and post-judgment interest accruing thereafter)