137 N.E.3d 1008
Ind. Ct. App.2019Background
- Daniel Tanoos was Superintendent of the Vigo County School Corporation (VCSC) from ~1999 to 2018; Energy Systems Group (ESG), via account manager Doug Tischbein, provided guaranteed energy savings contracts (GESCs) to VCSC over many years (nine contracts, >$42M between 2000–2016).
- FBI/SBOA information and search warrants produced emails and ESG expense records showing Tischbein expensed meals, tickets, and donations (>$18,000 expensed; >$83,000 in donations) tied to the VCSC account and interactions with Tanoos.
- The probable cause affidavit (PCA) alleges specific incidents where Tanoos solicited or accepted benefits from Tischbein/ESG around times ESG was pursuing VCSC projects: Aug 24, 2013 (Mo’s Steakhouse/Colts tickets); July 11, 2014 (Nashville dinner); Aug 10, 2014 (REO Speedwagon concert/limousine).
- The State charged Tanoos with three counts of bribery under I.C. § 35-44-1-2(a)(2), alleging he solicited/accepted property with intent to control performance of an act — specifically, recommendation to award/continue business with ESG to the school board.
- Tanoos moved to dismiss, arguing the State relied on a prohibited “generalized bribe” theory and failed to allege the specific quid pro quo required by Indiana law and McDonnell; the trial court denied the motion and found the PCA plus charging information sufficiently alleged the offense.
- Tanoos obtained interlocutory appellate review; the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Tanoos) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the charging information/PCA sufficiently alleges bribery under I.C. § 35-44-1-2(a)(2) | PCA and information, taken together, allege dates, communications, and a course of conduct showing Tanoos solicited and accepted benefits in exchange for recommending ESG to the school board | PCA fails to identify a specific quid pro quo; it alleges only a generalized promise to “recommend” future business, which is insufficient under Indiana precedent | Affirmed: charging documents sufficiently plead the offense; facts in PCA permit a jury to infer the required intent and quid pro quo; dismissal improper |
| 2) Whether McDonnell’s narrowed “official act”/specificity rule limits Indiana bribery pleading here | State: McDonnell is inapposite (federal statute/jury-instruction context) and does not require the level of specificity Tanoos demands for the State to survive a motion to dismiss | Tanoos: McDonnell requires a specific, focused official act; influencing the school board generally is too nebulous | Held: McDonnell is distinguishable and does not control dismissal here; specificity in McDonnell arose in the jury-instruction context, not as a pleading rule that defeats the PCA’s allegations |
| 3) Whether Wurster’s prohibition on "generalized bribe" indictments requires dismissal here | State: unlike Wurster, this case alleges specific dates, emails, ongoing projects, and a consistent pattern of recommending ESG, so it is not a generalized bribe theory | Tanoos: Wurster compels dismissal because counts only allege a general promise to support continued business without identifying a concrete promised act | Held: Wurster is distinguishable—Wurster’s indictment lacked dates and specific acts; here the PCA identifies time, communications, and a pattern tied to specific projects |
| 4) Whether factual disputes about motive/innocence should be resolved on a motion to dismiss | State: motions to dismiss test legal sufficiency only; facts in PCA are taken as true and credibility/factual issues go to the jury | Tanoos: the PCA does not supply facts sufficient to establish an illicit quid pro quo as a matter of law | Held: Motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle for resolving factual disputes; the court properly accepted PCA facts as true and denied dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Wurster v. State, 715 N.E.2d 341 (Ind. 1999) (indictments alleging only a broad, unspecified promise to act were inadequate; reversed dismissal on those pleading defects)
- McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (Supreme Court narrowed the definition of “official act” in federal bribery law and required focused specificity in jury instructions to avoid overbroad application)
- Winn v. State, 722 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (statement that an essential element of bribery is a quid pro quo)
- Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (charging information need only allege elements to give notice; detailed factual allegations are not required)