Daniel Retz v. William Seaton, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2021

On Nov. 29, 2008, Daniel Retz located his previously reported-stolen car with his ex-girlfriend; Omaha PD responded and detained the ex-girlfriend in a cruiser. Retz arrived, gestured and mouthed “Fuck you.”
Detective William Seaton arrested Retz for disorderly conduct and ordered him to place his hands on the hood; when Retz said he could not put his right arm behind his back due to recent rotator-cuff surgery, Seaton pulled the arm back, dislocating Retz’s shoulder.
Officers handcuffed Retz in front after the shoulder injury; Retz called Seaton a profanity, and the officers dispute whether Seaton pushed Retz to the ground a second time. Retz was ticketed and released.
Retz sued Seaton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force), pursuing both individual- and official-capacity claims; trial lasted three days and the jury awarded $31,505.23 to Retz.
During trial Retz used an Internal Affairs file (Exhibit 30) to impeach officers with inconsistent statements; Seaton sought to introduce a Chief’s letter (Exhibit 112) indicating the allegation was “not sustained,” but the district court excluded it as hearsay.
Seaton appealed, claiming (1) the district court erred in allowing Retz to voluntarily dismiss official-capacity claims mid-trial, (2) erred by permitting testimony about alternative courses officers could have taken, and (3) abused discretion by rejecting a proposed jury instruction stressing officers need only act reasonably, not prudently.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Retz)	Defendant's Argument (Seaton)	Held
Voluntary dismissal of official-capacity claims mid-trial	Dismissal was justified because Retz could not present evidence to support official-capacity theory	Dismissal was prejudicial because it rendered Exhibit 112 irrelevant after Retz had elicited Internal Affairs evidence	Court: No abuse of discretion; dismissal not prejudicial because Exhibit 30 remained admissible for impeachment, Exhibit 112 was hearsay, and both sides testified to its substantive conclusion
Admission of testimony about alternative courses of action	Testimony about what officers could have done is relevant to reasonableness under Graham totality-of-circumstances	Such questioning invites 20/20 hindsight and is irrelevant; only objective reasonableness matters	Court: No abuse; availability of alternatives can be relevant to whether an officer’s chosen method was objectively reasonable (but not to impose Monday-morning quarterbacking)
Rejection of Seaton’s proposed instruction emphasizing not having to choose the "most prudent" response	Model instruction suffices; plaintiff did not need the specific wording	Requested instruction was necessary to prevent jury from imposing a duty to choose the most prudent method	Court: No abuse; district court’s modified model instruction fairly and accurately stated the law and Seaton could argue his language in closing

Thatcher v. Hanover Ins. Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 1212 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for voluntary dismissal)
Hamm v. Rhone–Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 187 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1999) (factors for allowing voluntary dismissal)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry for use of force)
Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) (availability of alternative methods may be considered)
Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993) (officers need not choose the most prudent course)
S.E.C. v. Shanahan, 646 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2011) (excluded evidence cumulative to admitted evidence is not prejudicial)